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Dear Members of the Greater Boston Community:
Nearly three years ago the nation stood transfixed, watching the unfolding drama of the closest presidential
election in over a century. The national soul-searching that followed the 2000 election was focused on the 
states where the election had been the closest and where election administration seemed most questionable.
Massachusetts escaped much of this scrutiny, due to a combination of luck and skill—luck, because the failures
of punch card voting machines had already been demonstrated in a 1996 Massachusetts primary, leading to their
being banned in the state; skill, because Massachusetts has a long tradition of careful election administration.
Even though Massachusetts acquitted itself well in the 2000 presidential election, Bay State residents should
avoid complacence about how well elections are administered in the state. It is the mark of a well-functioning
democracy that it periodically casts a critical eye toward its most cherished institutions, asking the question,
“Even if it’s done well, can’t we do better?”
This report presents the findings of research conducted by a team from the Caltech/MIT Voting Technology
Project into voting in Massachusetts. The Voting Technology Project (VTP) has emerged as a leading objective
voice as the nation has searched for ways to apply technology more effectively to election administration. The
research in this report applies the broad knowledge the VTP has gained studying elections nationwide to the
particular case of Massachusetts.
After research on this report got underway in the summer of 2002, the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) emerged
from congressional stalemate, which President Bush signed into law in October. The passage and implementation
of HAVA provides an opportune moment (and much-needed funding) for the implementation of many of the
recommendations found here. Indeed, many of the report’s recommendations are now mandated by HAVA; the
only question is how quickly, decisively, and thoroughly the state acts. Other recommendations, such as the
institution of Election Day Registration, are facilitated by the Act, even if not required.
I strongly urge policy makers with a role in the electoral process and citizens of the Commonwealth to read and
consider the recommendations made in this report. Beyond responding to the urgency of meeting performance
deadlines established under HAVA, this report provides an agenda for the continual improvement of the quality
of our democracy in this Commonwealth.
Paul S. Grogan
President and CEO
The Boston Foundation 
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Preface
This report was written by MIT members of the Caltech/MIT Voting Technology Project, at the invitation and
through the generous funding of the Boston Foundation. It builds on research into voting reform nationwide that
we had previously published in 2001 in the report Voting: What Is/What Could Be, which was supported through
the generosity of the Carnegie Corporation of New York.
We have characterized current practices in Massachusetts using a variety of sources. Massachusetts election law
is of course publicly available. The Massachusetts Secretary of State biennially publishes Massachusetts Election
Statistics (Public Document 43), which was the source of election return information. We received information
about the 2002 election returns, along with information about town-by-town usage of election technology,
directly from the Elections Division of the Secretary of State’s Office. We also gathered invaluable insights about
the conduct of elections in Massachusetts through the generous advice of election professionals in the Boston
metropolitan area.
The report that follows is organized around a series of 24 recommendations. These recommendations grow out 
of the experience gained over the past two years by the Voting Technology Project, as we have talked to election
officials, voting technology vendors, and citizen groups throughout the country. These recommendations are
consistent with the “best practices” that have been highlighted in a series of conferences and reports, at the
national and state level, that have appeared over the past two years. Currently the most comprehensive
accounting of election reform nationwide is available through the Election Reform Information Project and 
its indispensable web site, www.electionline.com.
The research for this report was begun before the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) was passed in October 2002
and completed in mid-April 2003. Since then, election reform has progressed in Massachusetts and nationwide.
Most importantly, a steering committee to produce a Massachusetts state plan under HAVA has been appointed,
chaired by Secretary of State William Galvin. That committee began meeting in late spring 2003, under a deadline
to produce a state plan in September 2003. In another important development, the first electronic touch screen
voting device has been certified for use in Massachusetts.
Charles Stewart III, MIT Professor of Political Science, was primarily responsible for research into voting
technologies and for drafting this report. All questions concerning this report should be directed to Professor
Stewart. Julie Brogan, Esq., Project Coordinator of the Caltech/MIT Voting Technology Project, was primarily
responsible for research into Massachusetts election laws and regulations and into issues pertaining to polling
place practices.
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Massachusetts avoided the most egregious short-
comings that dogged many other states in the 2000
presidential election. Perhaps for that reason, the Bay
State has lagged behind most of the rest of the nation
in reforming antiquated election practices and
upgrading antiquated election technologies that
confuse and frustrate voters. The result is tens of
thousands of “lost votes” each statewide election—
votes that could be recovered by adopting a range 
of sweeping and incremental reforms.
Facilitating the move to reform is the Help America
Vote Act (HAVA), which will supply much-needed
funding to assist states, including Massachusetts,
upgrading voting equipment. The HAVA also has
requirements that will spur Massachusetts into
adopting certain “best practices” in election reform,
such as a comprehensive “provisional ballot” to
handle cases in which a voter’s registration is in
question on Election Day.
The Florida debacle in 2000 focused attention on the
failure of antiquated voting technologies in guarding
the sanctity of the franchise. Just as important in
protecting the quality of our voting rights, however, is
maintaining an accurate voter registration system and
staffing polling places so that voting occurs efficiently
and within all provisions of the law. Massachusetts
could greatly streamline its registration system and
increase voter turnout by adopting Election Day
Registration (EDR), at the same time it is replacing 
its most dated voting machines.
Positive Developments in Massachusetts 
Elections
■ Massachusetts has higher turnout and lower 
rates of voter registration problems than those
experienced nationwide.
■ The banning of Votomatic punch cards after 1996
allowed Massachusetts to avoid many of the most
serious problems that were highlighted in Florida in
2000. This change alone resulted in the recovery of
20,000 Massachusetts votes in 2000 that would have
been lost had the Votomatics continued to be used.
(pp. 10–13)
■ The Massachusetts Central Voter Registry, after a
rocky start, is a model for central voter registries
nationwide. (p. 7)
■ The Help America Vote Act will provide significant
funding to assist Massachusetts in making the most
pressing improvements to its voting technologies.
(p. 2)
Election-Related Problems
■ Massachusetts has lagged behind other states 
in investigating improvements to voting and
implementing election reform. (p. 13)
■ Using Census Bureau data, we estimate that 122,000
voters did not vote in Massachusetts in 2000 due to
registration problems or difficulties encountered at
polling places. (p. 3)
■ Thousands of votes continue to be lost in statewide
elections because of deficiencies in DataVote punch
cards and mechanical lever machines. Lever
machines are especially deficient in recording 
votes for ballot questions. (p. 12)
■ Almost half of all Massachusetts voters move 
their place of residence from one presidential
election to the other, making the upkeep of election
rolls a monumental task, and introducing many
opportunities for registration-related confusion 
on Election Day. (p. 7)
■ Recruiting and retaining skilled precinct workers 
is the biggest, and often least-appreciated, headache
facing most local election officials in the state. 
(p. 18)
■ Demand for more convenient forms of voting, such
as on-demand absentee voting, are growing, and
the laws of Massachusetts are ill equipped to handle
this demand. (p. 21)
Executive Summary
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Voter Registration: Proposals for Reform
■ Massachusetts should adopt Election Day
Registration (EDR), to reduce Election Day
registration confusion and to encourage even
greater turnout. (p. 4-5)
■ Massachusetts should adopt standard “provisional
ballot” practices that are consistent with those in
virtually all other states in the nation. (p. 9)
■ Massachusetts should require proper identification
of all voters. (p. 5)
■ Massachusetts should adopt administrative
remedies to facilitate the use of driver license
records to keep voter registration current. (p. 7)
■ Voter registration information should be broadly,
and directly, available to precinct workers on
Election Day. (p. 8)
■ Massachusetts should adopt aggressive voter
education measures aimed at steering prospective
voters to the right polling places on Election Day.
(p. 6)
■ Massachusetts should adopt new anti-fraud
legislation to guard the integrity of Election Day
Registration. (p. 6)
Voting Technologies: Proposals for Reform
■ The Secretary of State should decertify mechanical
lever machines and DataVote punch cards for use 
in Massachusetts. (p. 13-14)
■ Massachusetts should change its election laws to
make it easier to certify electronic voting machines
that otherwise meet Massachusetts voting machine
standards. (p. 14-15)
■ The interpretation of Massachusetts election laws
should be changed to allow voters to be notified if
they have over-voted on an optically scanned ballot.
(p. 15-16)
■ Localities should not lock themselves into stagnant
voting technologies in a time of technological flux.
Massachusetts should encourage localities to lease,
not buy, new voting equipment. (p. 15)
■ The Secretary of State should expeditiously move to
establish a task force to develop a statewide plan for
the improvement of voting technologies. (p. 16)
Polling Place Practices: Proposals for Reform
■ Massachusetts should abolish the requirement that
election officials be registered to vote in the town 
or city where they staff the polls. (p. 18)
■ Massachusetts should begin experimenting with
methods of in-person early voting. (p. 21-22)
■ Cities and towns should be encouraged to use
municipal clerical employees as polling place
workers on Election Day. All levels of government
should grant its employees a paid day of leave if
they work as an election official on Election Day. 
(p. 18-19)
■ Cities and towns should be allowed to experiment
with using students as polling place workers. 
(p. 18-19)
■ Massachusetts should issue voter registration cards
to all voters every two years as a way of educating
voters about where they should vote. (p. 19)
■ Local officials should be more diligent in ensuring
accessibility to polling places for disabled voters. 
(p. 20-21)
Election Reform Leadership
■ The Secretary of State should act quickly to appoint
a permanent director of the State Elections Division.
(p. 23)
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Residents of the Bay State pride
themselves in their long tradition of
robust political participation. Symbolized
by the New England town meeting,
participatory governance is written 
in our laws and culture.
Events of the past three years have
raised questions about the quality of
elections in the United States. In the
wake of the electoral debacle that 
beset Florida in 2000, many states re-
examined their electoral procedures and
voting technologies to ensure that “Florida won’t
happen here.” A major exception was Massachusetts,
where no significant public review of election
procedures or voting technology has taken place.1
Although Massachusetts lacks the most egregious
deficiencies in electoral procedures that were
highlighted in Florida and other states in 2000, the
Commonwealth still needs election reform. Election
procedures in Massachusetts are tradition-bound,
often failing to account for changes in society over the
past century. As a result, voters and election officials
often labor under procedures that depress turnout 
and create polling place confusion. Antiquated voting
technologies malfunction and confuse voters, resulting
in lost votes.
Massachusetts has historically been an innovator in
using technologies and procedures to enhance the
quality of voting. Other states have now taken that
lead. It is time for the Commonwealth to recapture 
its spirit of full inclusion and innovation in elections.
The purpose of this report is to suggest some ways 
this might happen.
The electoral process in Massachusetts could be
improved in numerous ways, large and small. 
Among the most important are the following:
■ Massachusetts should adopt Election
Day Registration, to help end confusion
about how and where citizens can
register and vote, and to help local
election officials cope with the rapidly-
rising mountain of paperwork that
accompanies the registration process.
■ Massachusetts should ban the use 
of mechanical lever machines and
“DataVote” punch cards, and move to
certify state-of-the-art Direct Register
Electronic (DRE) voting equipment. 
■ Massachusetts should adopt “provisional ballots”
so that qualified voters, who are uncertain about
their registration status on Election Day, can cast 
a ballot that will be counted, once the confusion 
is clarified.
■ Massachusetts should change its laws governing
who may serve as a precinct election official and
adopt administrative practices that encourage 
state and local workers to staff polling places on
Election Day.
■ The Secretary of State should appoint a permanent
director of the Elections Division who possesses
exceptional management and political skills, to 
help lead the state in a much-needed upgrade in 
its voting procedures.
■ The Governor and Secretary of State should establish
a “blue ribbon panel” of citizens and public officials
to review election procedures in the Commonwealth,
similar to dozens of such commissions in other states
that have reviewed issues like voting technology,
registration procedures, and polling place practices
in other states.
Introduction
1
1 Election Reform Information Project, Election Reform since November 2001: What’s Changed, What Hasn’t, and Why, 
October 2002.
It is time for 
the Commonwealth 
to recapture its spirit 
of full inclusion 
and innovation 
in elections. 
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Adopting these election reforms has become more
imperative, and more attainable, because of the
passage of the Help American Vote Act of 2002
(HAVA).2 Important provisions of HAVA include 
the following:
■ Funding for the elimination of punch card and lever
machines and for the improvement of election
administration. Title I of the act provides payments to
states to eliminate substandard election technologies,
allocating those funds on a formula basis that could
amount to over $6 million for Massachusetts in the
next fiscal year alone. Furthermore, Title I also
allows states to apply for funds to improve the
administration of elections, including improving
voter education and election procedures, and
training election officials.
■ Establishment of voting system standards. States 
must use voting systems that comply with certain
standards. For instance, a voter must be able to
verify votes before casting a ballot and must be
notified if he or she overvotes on a ballot. Voting
machines must be accessible to individuals with
disabilities, and each voting precinct must have 
at least one direct recording electronic machine 
to ensure that people with disabilities can vote
privately and independently.
The Appendix to this report summarizes the
provisions of HAVA and assesses what changes 
may be needed in the Massachusetts election 
system in light of HAVA.
The recently passed Omnibus Appropriations Bill by
the United States Congress provides federal funding
for these provisions, so there is no financial reason for
Massachusetts to fail to adopt most of the proposals 
outlined here.
The remainder of this report assesses the current state
of elections in Massachusetts, making the case for
these, and other, reforms. This report was undertaken
by the Caltech/MIT Voting Technology Project (VTP)
at the request of the Boston Foundation. In the
summer of 2001 the VTP released a report, Voting:
What Is/What Could Be,
which assessed voting
procedures and 
voting technologies
nationwide.3 We have
applied much of what
we learned in the
process of writing that
report, and in studying
election systems over
the past two years, to 
our assessment of
Massachusetts.
Our study of
Massachusetts is
divided into three 
major parts. First 
we examine voter
registration in
Massachusetts, 
which is a matter 
that requires even
greater attention 
from the state than the well-publicized problems with
voting machines in the 2000 election. Second, we turn
our attention to voting technologies in Massachusetts.
Massachusetts avoided the worst performance
problems that beset states like Florida in 2000, but 
its continued use of mechanical lever machines and
DataVote punch cards results in an unacceptable
number of lost votes, particularly on ballot questions.
Finally, we examine polling place practices, making
proposals to improve the staffing of precincts and to
facilitate greater convenience for voters.
The recently passed
Omnibus Appropriations
Bill by the United States
Congress provides 
federal funding for 
these provisions, 
so there is no 
financial reason for
Massachusetts to fail 
to adopt most of the
proposals outlined here.
2 Public Law 107-252.
3 The full report is available online at http://vote.caltech.edu/Reports/index.html.
V o t i n g  i n  M a s s a c h u s e t t s
In 1800 Massachusetts became the 
first state to require the pre-registration
of voters. Voter registration became
universal across the United States nearly
a century later. These reforms were the
product of a strange coalition of forces—
Progressives, who wanted to clean up
politics by excluding non-citizens and
other “non-desirables,” and political
bosses, who wanted to have greater
control over who voted.4
Voter registration may have provided
the benefit of reducing election fraud,
but it came at a significant cost, throwing
up significant hurdles against the
participation of legitimate voters. These
barriers are so severe that research has
consistently shown that registration-related
procedures, not factors such as voter alienation, 
are the primary reason why voter turnout is so 
low in the United States.
In our 2001 nationwide report, we estimated that
roughly 4 million registered voters were denied the
right to vote nationwide in 2000 because of problems
with their registration or problems with polling
places.5 This is a striking fact, dwarfing the number 
of votes (2 million) that were lost because of the
deficiencies of voting machines that were so
thoroughly discussed after the November 
2000 election.
Registration is a huge, yet mostly hidden barrier to the
full participation of all citizens in American elections.
It is just as big a problem in Massachusetts. Using the
same methodology as our nationwide report, we
estimate that 122,000 registered voters
in 2000 did not cast a ballot because of
registration-based problems.6
Three major factors account for why
registered voters who show up at the
polls on Election Day nonetheless fail
to cast a ballot. First, the voter may
have registered so soon before the
election that the registration may not
have been processed. Second, the voter
may have failed to re-register after
moving. Third, the voter may have
shown up at the wrong polling place.
There are no systematic studies to
quantify how many registered 
voters have what type of registration
problem. We have heard enough anecdotes from
voters and from local election officials over the past
two years to convince us that Election Day registration
problems are not trivial. The question is whether the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts can do anything to
address these problems.
In our view, there are two paths that Massachusetts
could take to reduce the number of Election Day
registration problems that face voters. The first is
radical—Massachusetts could adopt Election Day
Registration. The second is incremental—
Massachusetts could adopt a series of “best practices”
that have already proved effective in other states.
Voter Registration
3
Voter registration may
have provided the benefit
of reducing election 
fraud, but it came at a
significant cost, throwing
up significant hurdles
against the participation 
of legitimate voters. 
4 Alex Kessar, The Right to Vote, pp. 65–66, 151–159.
5 Voting: What Is/What Could Be, pp. 8-9. 
6 In 2000 there were 1.3 million registered Massachusetts voters who did not vote. According to the Voting and Registration
Supplement to the 2000 Current Population Survey (U.S. Census Bureau), 9.4% of registered non-voters in Massachusetts
gave as their reason for not voting “registration problems.” This works out to roughly 122,000 voters, or approximately 60
“lost votes” due to registration problems at each precinct.
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RECOMMENDATION # 1. Massachusetts should adopt
Election Day Registration (EDR), to reduce Election
Day registration confusion and to encourage even
greater Election Day turnout.
Six states nationwide have eliminated the practice 
of cutting off voter registration several weeks before
Election Day, allowing registration to occur on Election
Day itself. (These states are Idaho, Maine, Minnesota,
New Hampshire, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.) The
states that have adopted EDR have found two major
advantages to this reform. First, and most important,
any eligible voter who goes to the correct polling 
place on Election Day is allowed to vote. Problems
with registering before some pre-election deadline,
processing last-minute registrations, or forgetting to
re-register after moving are eliminated. Second, the
administrative burden on local election officials of
processing new registrations is shifted to after Election
Day. The administrative burden of maintaining voter
lists is not eliminated, but the timing of the burden is
shifted away from the most hectic season of the voting
cycle to the (relatively) calmer post-election period.
With Election Day voter registration, voting is
simplified to a one-step procedure whereby 
qualified individuals with a valid identification 
may register at the same time that they vote. There 
are some difficulties associated with Election Day
Registration (EDR), but the benefits from EDR are
worth the effort required to meet these challenges.
The most notable benefit of EDR is increased voter
participation. Studies show that Election Day
Registration produces a 3 to 6 percentage point
increase in participation in the states that have
adopted it. Professors Michael Alvarez of the
California Institute of Technology and Stephen
Ansolabehere of the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, both with the Caltech/MIT Voting
Technology Project, recently conducted a study to
determine whether the state of California would
benefit from EDR.8 They found that EDR in California
would lead to an increase in participation by up to 
1.2 million individuals, especially among young
people and people who have moved recently. They
also found that EDR is a non-partisan reform because
the participation rates would improve in California
without much change in the partisan composition of
the electorate. We know no reason why this analysis
wouldn’t apply to Massachusetts, though of course 
on a smaller scale.
The main difficulty with EDR, according to Alvarez
and Ansolabehere, is making sure that new voters go
to the right polling place. Their study found that this
problem could be overcome with improved voter
education. The year after Minnesota adopted EDR,
Minneapolis reported that half of all polling place
registrations happened in the wrong polling place.
Today, however, less than one percent are reported 
in the wrong location. Their study also found that the
extensive voter education campaign undertaken by 
the state of Minnesota did not have a significant fiscal
impact on the overall cost of the election. 
7 Alvarez and Ansolabehere cite the following academic studies as providing a good overview of the effects of registration
laws on turnout: C.L. Brians, Voter Registration Laws and Turnout in American: The Last Two Decades, Ph.D. Dissertation,
University of California, Irvine, 1997; C.L. Brians and B. Grofman, “When Registration Barriers Fall, Who Votes? An
Empirical Test of a Rational Choice Model”, Public Choice 99, 161-176, 1999; M.J. Fenster, “The Impact of Allowing Day 
of Registration Voting on Turnout in U.S. Elections from 1960 to 1992”, American Politics Quarterly, 22(1), 74-87, 1994; 
B. Highton, “Easy Registration and Voter Turnout”, Journal of Politics, 59(2), 565-575, 1997; S. Knack, “Election-Day
Registration: The Second Wave”, American Politics Quarterly, 29(1), 65-78, 2001; G.E. Mitchell and C. Wlezian, “The Impact
of Legal Constraints on Voter Registration, Turnout, and the Composition of the American Electorate”, Political Behavior
17(2), 179-202, 1995; S. Rhine, “Registration Reform and Turnout Change in the American States”, American Politics
Quarterly 23(4), 409-426, 1995; R.A. Teixeira, The Disappearing American Voter, Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute, 
1992; R.E. Wolfinger and S. J. Rosenstone, Who Votes?, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1980. S.J. Rosenstone and 
J.M. Hansen, Mobilization, Participation and Democracy in America. New York: Macmillan, 1993.
8 R. Michael Alvarez and Stephen Ansolabehere, California Votes: The Promise of Election Day Registration, New York, 
Demos, 2002
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One common concern
about EDR is that it
opens up opportunities
for fraud. Alvarez 
and Ansolabehere
discovered, however,
that fraud was not a
great problem in states
with EDR because 
the reform has been
coupled with imposing
heavy penalties for
registration fraud.
Their study quotes
Renee Coffee of
Ramsey County
Minnesota’s Election
Office (St. Paul) as saying: “There’s minimal-to-no
fraud…. It’s a felony. It’s just not worth it. There’s a
minimum fine of $10,000 or 1 to 2 years in prison.”9 
One cost of adopting EDR would be the requirement
that identification be produced at the polling place the
first time someone voted at a precinct. Although this 
is a common requirement nationwide, Massachusetts
is the rare instance of a state that gives localities the
discretion to decide whether identification must be
shown by all voters. Our conversations with election
officials lead us to conclude that Massachusetts voters
rarely have to provide identification at the polls. 
EDR would require poll workers to request proper
identification from those who register at the polling
place. This objection has largely been rendered moot,
however, since the recently passed Help America Vote
Act (HAVA) requires most newly registered voters to
show an identification card the first time they vote.
Increased voter participation is reason enough to
adopt EDR, but we see other benefits as well. EDR
would eliminate the confusion caused by registration
problems at the polls. There would no longer be late
registrants, inactive voters, or clerical errors holding
up check-in lines. Polling place check-in lines could
easily refer voters to a registration table a few feet
away, rather than making voters wait while a warden
tried to reach city hall, or worse, send them away with
the hopes they will register before the next election.
The penalty for being an inactive voter would be
reduced from what it is today (possibly being denied
the opportunity to vote) to the slight inconvenience 
of being sent to a registration table across the room. 
Voters seem to prefer the one-step process. Registering
at the polls is the main way that voters now register 
in states with EDR. In states with only pre-election
registration, people rely heavily on registration at
departments of motor vehicles, registration by mail,
and registration drives run by a non-government
organizations. 
EDR is the most sweeping administrative reform 
we recommend to improve the quality of voting 
in Massachusetts. With or without adopting this 
more comprehensive type of reform, registration
procedures in Massachusetts are full of problems, no
one of which presents a significant barrier to voting,
but taken together diminish the quality of voting
statewide. These more incremental reforms should 
be adopted, too.
RECOMMENDATION # 2. Massachusetts should
require proper identification of all voters, including
driver licenses, utility bills, or affidavits signed by
registered voters.
If EDR were adopted, clearly establishing the identity
of each voter would be essential, to guard against
mistaken or fraudulent voting. Under the provisions
of the Help America Vote Act, Massachusetts will be
required to change its law to require most first-time
voters to show such identification. We recognize that
many civil rights and civil liberties groups oppose
identification procedures and regard them as ripe 
for intimidation. However, civil rights laws can be
invoked to prosecute those who intimidate voters. As
with all reforms, adopting identification requirements
is a balancing act. We believe that the real likelihood
that voter turnout would increase under EDR
outweighs possible problems with intimidation.
9 Alvarez and Ansolabehere, p. 14.
With Election Day voter
registration, voting is
simplified to a one-step
procedure whereby
qualified individuals with 
a valid identification may
register at the same time
that they vote. 
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RECOMMENDATION # 3. Massachusetts should adopt
aggressive voter education measures aimed at
steering prospective voters to the right polling 
places on Election Day.
If new voters are going to register at polling places,
they need to know where to go the first time. Local
election officials already work hard to notify currently
registered voters of their polling locations. Further
efforts to reach non-voters, through the mass media
and bulk mailings, would also be necessary.
The Massachusetts Secretary of State’s web site
already contains a lookup feature that allows anyone
to type in his or her street address and receive in
response the proper polling location. This site, which
is among the simplest and most powerful polling place
search engines in the country, is a good starting place
for such an effort.10
RECOMMENDATION # 4. Massachusetts should adopt
new anti-fraud legislation to guard the integrity of
Election Day Registration.
In the current electoral environment, voting fraud is
rare in Massachusetts, as it is throughout the United
States. However, because the primary objection to
Election Day Registration concerns its seeming
invitation to fraud, stiffer penalties and enforcement
procedures need to be adopted if EDR is to succeed.
We agree that something like the anti-fraud
provisions adopted by Minnesota would be
appropriate in Massachusetts under Election Day
Registration. Minnesota went a step beyond most
states, requiring county prosecutors to give prompt
attention to all reports of voter fraud that were
referred to them. The Minnesota election commission
also has the jurisdiction to prosecute election fraud
cases directly, rather than relying entirely on the
attorney general—a power the Massachusetts
Elections Division does not have.
If Election Day
Registration is 
not adopted in
Massachusetts, 
then a number of
incremental changes
must be instigated to
bring the quality of
election administration
up to a level expected
by Massachusetts
residents. Some of these
incremental changes
would also improve 
the implementation of
EDR. To understand
these more incremental
changes, we must first
discuss how election
data are maintained in
the Commonwealth.
Formally, Massachusetts
municipalities are responsible for registering voters;
the database of voters maintained by the state is
actually the “property” of the 351 cities and towns in
the Commonwealth. That the state maintains a central
database of voters is a relatively new development,
brought on by the passage of the National Voter
Registration Act (NVRA) in 1993.11 The NVRA, also
known as the “Motor Voter Law,” was passed because
many people believed that registration barriers were
keeping voters from the polls. There were three major
provisions of that act:
1. States were required to allow citizens to
register to vote when they received state
services, such as applying for driver’s 
licenses or welfare benefits.
2. States were required to accept mail-in voter
registration cards.
3. States were limited in purging voter rolls
because of non-voting and for other common
reasons (such as moving within an election
district).
10 The URL for this search engine is http://www.wheredoivotema.com. 
11 42 U.S.C. 1973gg-5(a), (b),
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Massachusetts has complied with the provisions of 
the NVRA, to mixed success. The Commonwealth
established the Central Voter Registry (CVR)—a
centralized voter database maintained by the Secretary
of State’s Office—to help manage the recordkeeping
burden that the NVRA placed on the towns and cities.
The CVR is particularly useful in streamlining the
process of removing voters from the rolls in one
community when they have moved to another
community, or another state.
After a bit of a rocky start, the CVR has emerged 
as a model for the nation. 
On the whole the NVRA has shifted the location of 
voter registration dramatically over the past decade.
Whereas citizens once had to trek to the local city or
town hall during (often short and erratic) office hours 
to register or just change their address, the relatively
mundane task of registering to vote can be handled 
at the voter’s convenience, either through the mail or
dozens of state offices. In Massachusetts, 64% of recent
voter registrations have been handled by the Registry 
of Motor Vehicles and 17% have been handled by mail,
leaving a tiny fraction now handled by local town halls.12
Even though the CVR has functioned well in recent
years, voter registration in Massachusetts still labors
under antiquated practices that result in significant
inconvenience to voters and election officials during
every election. The biggest problem involves keeping
track of voters who move. According to the Census
Bureau, 13% of eligible voters in Massachusetts moved
within the year prior to the 2000 presidential election,
27% had moved in the
previous two years,
and 41% had moved
between the 1996 and
2000 presidential
elections.13
Given this high
mobility rate, 
simply keeping track 
of voters once they
have registered is 
a daunting task.
RECOMMENDATION # 5. Massachusetts should adopt
a unique numerical identifier for each Massachusetts
voter, either the voter’s driver’s license number or a
combination of the voter’s last name and last four
digits of their Social Security number.
RECOMMENDATION # 6. Massachusetts should adopt
a program to facilitate the linking of information
among driver’s license, vital statistics, and the CVR.
One problem in Massachusetts, as in the rest of the
nation, is removing duplicates from the CVR. This
problem arises for two separate reasons. The first is 
the lack of a unique identifier for each voter in the
CVR. Common names, variant spellings of names, 
and suffixes (such as “Jr.” and “III”) often make it
difficult to purge deadwood from the voting rolls
appropriately. The second reason is the failure of
government bodies to coordinate collateral databases
in order to keep voting rolls up to date. For instance,
although most Massachusetts residents now register to
vote at the Registry of Motor Vehicles, few know that
when they move and change their address on the
driver’s license, the voter registry is not automatically
updated. When a registered voter changes addresses
with the Registry of Motor vehicles, his or her voter
registration should automatically be updated. Indeed,
it is possible to imagine registration automatically
occurring when a teenage driver’s license holder who
was a citizen turned 18. However, none of this can
happen without an unambiguous way to link
information between the RMV and the CVR.
Massachusetts should strive to create a system
wherein a change in a driver’s license address
automatically triggers a change in voter registration.
One needed improvement in intergovernmental
coordination is outside the Commonwealth’s hands: 
it would be enormously helpful if United States Postal
Service change-of-address orders were automatically
communicated to Massachusetts election officials.
However, as nationwide, the inability of the Postal
Service to share this information with election officials
causes voting rolls to be inaccurate and, ultimately,
causes voters inconvenience on Election Day.
12 U.S. Federal Election Commission, Impact of the National Voter Registration Act on Federal Elections, 1999–2000.
13 U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, Voting and Registration Supplement, 2000, public use data file.
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RECOMMENDATION # 7. Massachusetts should adopt
the federal voter registration card for its own
registrations, and should allow facsimiles of the
form to be used for registration.
The NVRA established a national voter registration
card, mostly as a service for overseas voters seeking to
register. This form, which is maintained by the Federal
Election Commission, may be used by almost every
state for registration. Massachusetts is one of only 
six states that require voter registration forms to be
printed on a prescribed card stock. We do not see 
any purpose that this requirement serves, nor do we
understand why photocopies of the state form may
not be used for registration. If Georgia can deliver
voter registration forms to its residents directly via
Internet download, so can Massachusetts.
RECOMMENDATION # 8. Massachusetts residents
should be able to confirm their voter registration
quickly, online.
One way for voters to confirm that they are registered
to vote—or to confirm that a change-of-address
notification has been processed—is to check their
registration status before Election Day. Massachusetts
voters cannot currently do this directly, but must go
through their local registrar. Some states (such as
Georgia, North Carolina, and Virginia) and localities
(such as Champaign County, Illinois; Orange County,
Florida; and Utah County, Utah) allow individual
voters to confirm their registration status directly
online. Adding such a feature to the Election Division’s
web site would bring the Commonwealth into line
with nationwide “best practice.”
RECOMMENDATION # 9. Registration information
should be broadly, and directly, available to precinct
workers on Election Day.
There is a major disconnect between the quality of
registration information available to the state and to
local registrars, on the one hand, and precinct workers,
on the other. The CRV lists the ward and precinct, date
and place of registration of every registered voter in
the state. On the other
hand, the paper
printouts used to
check-in voters at the
polls contain only the
names and addresses
of active voters in that
precinct. If someone
arrives at a precinct
and is not on the paper
printout, there are problems. The only way to confirm
that such a person is actually registered or needs to be
redirected to a different precinct is to call the local
election office.
Even under the best of circumstances, local registrars
are swamped on Election Day. It is common for
precinct workers looking to verify a voter registration
to receive endless busy signals; the same is true of
individual voters trying to sort out their own
registration problems. In addition, some polling
places, such as school gymnasiums, do not have
phones, so the chief election officer on site must find
an office or pay phone. During the 2002 primary
election, the City of Boston rented cell phones and
gave them to poll workers. This helped somewhat, 
but the quality of reception varied among polling
places and some could not make any calls. Even with 
a phone nearby, however, a missing name slows down
the check-in line.
Not surprisingly, stories abound of confused and
frustrated voters leaving in frustration, not voting,
even though broader dissemination of voter
registration information at the precincts might
alleviate the problem.
Voters who show up at the wrong precinct on Election
Day should not have to be referred to city hall to find
out where they are supposed to vote. In smaller towns
and most cities, each polling place should have a
comprehensive list of all registered voters in the
municipality, indicating the precinct where each 
voter is supposed to vote. In larger cities, this sort of
information could be distributed to polling places
electronically. A “best practice” in this area is Orange
County, Florida, which distributes laptop computers 
to each precinct in the county, loaded with a CD-ROM
database that contains all voter registration records for
the county.
Not surprisingly, stories
abound of confused and
frustrated voters leaving
in frustration, not voting
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RECOMMENDATION # 10. Massachusetts should
adopt standard “provisional ballot” practices that are
consistent with those in other states in the nation.
Prompted by the passage of the NVRA in 1993, many
states began to adopt “fail safe” or “provisional
balloting” provisions, to deal with voters who had
registration problems on Election Day. This provision
has been instrumental in allowing voters with registra-
tion problems to actually cast a ballot on Election Day.
Massachusetts has not adopted such a practice. Similar
procedures in Massachusetts, “escrow ballots” and
“challenge ballots,” are inadequate to the task.
Although detailed practices vary state-to-state, the
following description generally applies. Provisional
ballots are used whenever a voter appears at a precinct
on Election Day and there is a question about his or her
registration. If the problem cannot be resolved then and
there, the voter is offered a “provisional ballot,” which
is marked by the voter and then sealed in an envelope,
much like an absentee ballot. The outside of the envelope
has pertinent information identifying the voter, so that
his or her registration status can later be investigated.
Once the polls are closed, the registration status of
everyone who cast a provisional ballot is ascertained
in a timely fashion, before the final canvass of the vote.
If the registration checks out, the ballot is opened and
counted. If the registration does not check out, the
ballot is discarded.
In states that have adopted aggressive provisional
ballot provisions, thousands of voters who otherwise
would have been sent home angry on Election Day,
have had their vote eventually counted. Wake County,
North Carolina in November 2000 is a good example
of how provisional ballots can avert an electoral
disaster. In November 2000, 30,000 people appeared at
the polls in Wake County on Election Day to find their
names were not on the rolls. Rather than send them to
the county courthouse to resolve the situation, or send
them home without casting a ballot, these individuals
were allowed to vote a provisional ballot. In the weeks
immediately following Election Day, the registration
problem that had led to so many people being missing
from the voting rolls was resolved, and most of the
votes were eventually counted.
Although Massachusetts does have provisions in its
election law that look like provisional ballots, they are
paper shells. These ballots are almost always thrown
away without being counted.
Currently, whenever a Massachusetts resident
appears at a precinct and discovers that she or he is
not on the voting rolls, the voter has two remedies: 
(1) sign a statement certifying continued residency 
at a voting address within the precinct; or (2) cast 
an “escrow ballot.”
If an escrow ballot is cast, it is then sealed and
delivered to the local registrars when the polls close.14
Local registrars hold onto escrow ballots until the
initial count is complete. If the total number of escrow
ballots deposited with the municipality will not affect
the outcome of the race, then the registrars do not have
to make an investigation and include all properly cast
ballots in the count.
We have yet to talk with a local election official who
remembers escrow ballots actually being counted. The
escrow ballot in Massachusetts is a mechanism that
leads directly to the disenfranchisement of voters.
Properly registered voters who find themselves
inadvertently left off the rolls should not be treated this
way. By adopting a true provisional ballot, as has been
done in states like California and North Carolina,
Massachusetts will move a large step toward ensuring
that all voters are heard. In fact, HAVA requires all states
to adopt provisional balloting provisions by January 1,
2004. We urge the legislature to adopt the provision
earlier than that, so that local officials can gain experience
with their use before the next federal election.
Simply adopting provisional ballot provisions 
does not guarantee that all voters with registration
problems will be offered a provisional ballot when 
it is appropriate. We have heard many stories
nationwide of voters not being offered a provisional
ballot when that was the appropriate remedy, just as
we have heard many stories of escrow ballots not
being offered to Massachusetts voters when that was
the appropriate course of action. A critical feature of
any new provisional ballot law in Massachusetts
would include vigorous education of precinct workers
to ensure that everyone who is entitled to vote using 
a provisional ballot receives one.
14 Mass Gen. L., ch 51, §59A.
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Throughout much of its history 
the only voting equipment used in
Massachusetts was the hand counted
paper ballot. Today, four-fifths of the
municipalities in the Commonwealth,
and 97% of the voters, use technology
to speed the count. The first set of
payments available to Massachusetts
under the Help America Vote Act of
2002 will be directed toward upgrades
or replacement of some of this voting
equipment. 
Voting equipment refers to the balloting
method used for capturing, casting, and
counting a voter’s preferences. There are
five basic types of voting equipment
used in the United States: hand counted
paper ballots, optically scanned ballots,
punch card ballots, mechanical lever
machines, and direct recording
electronic devices (“DRE”, “ATM-style”
or “touch screen”).15 The first three of
these are paper-based technologies that
separate the instrument used to capture a voter’s
preferences, the paper ballot, from the casting and
counting mechanism. Lever machines and DRE’s, 
on the other hand, are technologies that combine
capturing, casting, and counting in a unified machine.
All of these types of systems, except DREs, are certified
for use in Massachusetts (Table 1). Hand counted 
paper is used in 77, mostly rural, communities in the
Commonwealth. The majority of jurisdictions rely on
optical scan voting systems, in which a voter indicates
his or her preference on a paper ballot that is fed into
an electronic scanner to be read and tabulated.
The older mechanical lever machines, which were first
introduced in Massachusetts in the mid-twentieth
century, require the voter to pull levers
that record the vote on gears on the back
of the machines. Only 19 municipalities,
including Boston, still use lever mach-
ines, but they are slowly replacing them
with optical scanning. The City of
Boston recently tested optical scanners
for a final election for district city
councilor in Allston-Brighton and plans
to transition fully to optical scanning by
the 2004 presidential election.
Table 2 summarizes the change in
voting technologies used by
Massachusetts since 1960. Prior to 
1960 only a few cities in Massachusetts
used mechanical lever machines,
Boston being the first in the state to
adopt them. During the 1960s a few
municipalities adopted the newly
developed Votomatic technology, which
relied on pre-scored cards to record
votes. (These are the notorious devices
used in Palm Beach County, Florida.)
The 1960s was primarily a time for the expansion of
mechanical lever machines. During that decade,
Massachusetts went from having 23% of its ballots 
cast on mechanical machines in 1960 to 28% in 1972.
The diffusion of mechanical lever machines ceased
during the 1970s, as it did nationwide, while the
spread of two types of punch card technologies
increased. The most rapid growth occurred in the
Votomatic machines. However, a new punch card
technology was also introduced to the state—the
"DataVote" technology. DataVote differed from
Votomatic in that the cards were not pre-scored.
Rather, with DataVote technology, the voter makes 
a hole to indicate his or her vote with a spring-
loaded punch.16
Voting Technology
15 Mass Gen. L., ch 51, §59A.
16 Many people have speculated that the DataVote technology is inherently superior to the Votomatic since the former has 
the names actually printed on the ballot, while the latter does not, and because the DataVote hole is cleaner. This
speculation does not hold up to empirical scrutiny, at least in Massachusetts.
There are five basic 
types of voting 
equipment used in the
United States: hand
counted paper ballots,
optically scanned 
ballots, punch card 
ballots, mechanical 
lever machines, and 
direct recording 
electronic devices 
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The 1980s witnessed the introduction of yet another
voting technology, the optically scanned paper ballot.
With the spread of the optical scanning of ballots, the
development of voting technologies entered into 
a second, more mature phase. As before, many
municipalities that used hand-counted paper ballots
jumped to the new technologies. In addition, some
cities and towns that had previously jumped to
mechanical lever machines climbed the technological
ladder even further, also upgrading to optical scanners.
This upgrading strategy received an enormous boost
in the aftermath of the 10th congressional district
Democratic primary in 1996.17 The particulars of 
the race are these: Norfolk County District Attorney
William Delahunt and former state representative
Philip W. Johnston faced each other in the Democratic
primary in the 10th congressional district, in an open
seat to replace Gerry Studds. The initial count on
primary night revealed that Johnston had won by 
215 votes. Delahunt demanded a recount after it was
discovered that 1,555 of the 7,201 votes (22%) cast in
Weymouth and Brockton, Delahunt strongholds, were
blank. The recount dropped Johnston's lead to 175
votes. However, Delahunt sued in state court, arguing
that 956 disputed punch-card ballots that had been
counted as blanks should be examined for evidence 
of voter intent.
Superior Court Judge Elizabeth B. Donovan, who
decided the case, inspected the 956 disputed ballots
herself, determining that many of them indicated 
a preference for one of the two candidates. When
Donovan's canvass of the disputed ballots was
completed, she declared Delahunt the winner by 
175 votes. Johnston
appealed to the
Supreme Judicial Court
which, in the end,
upheld Donovan's
finding.18 Delahunt
remained the
Democratic nominee
and was elected to
Congress from the 10th
district in November.
The story was completed in the following months. 
The Weymouth town meeting voted in December 
1996 to replace its Votomatic system with an optical
scan voting system, to the tune of $117,000—
reversing course from previous failures of the town to
appropriate the money to upgrade voting equipment.
Secretary of State William Galvin decertified Votomatic
punch cards as voting equipment in Massachusetts 
in October 1997 and the legislature passed an
appropriation to create a revolving loan fund to 
allow localities to replace punch card voting systems.
The decertification of the Votomatic devices led to 
the most rapid shift in voting technologies in the
Commonwealth’s history. Between 1996 and 2000
roughly one-quarter of Massachusetts voters saw a
change in their voting technologies. This fortuitous
shift allowed the Commonwealth to avoid much of 
the controversy over voting technologies that beset 
the nation following the 2000 presidential election.
In Voting: What Is/What Could Be, we reported on the
performance of voting technologies across the country,
using a measure we termed “residual vote.” The
17 The account presented here relies heavily on newspaper accounts from the Quincy Patriot Ledger and the Boston Globe. 
See Matt Devine and Gary Susswein, "Torn Over Recount: Aids Collect Signatures," Patriot Ledger, Sept. 19, 1996, p. 1. 
"Key Dates in 10th District Recount," Patriot Ledger, Oct. 5, 1996, p. 5. Matt Devine and Mark Hamblett, "Judge: Delahunt
Wins; Johnston Says Election Was ‘Stolen' from Him," Patriot Ledger, Oct. 5, 1996, p. 1. Brian C. Mooney and John Ellement,
"And the Winner Is . . . ? SJC Ruling Expected Soon on Contested Ballots in 10th," Boston Globe, p. A1. Julie Fields, "Town
Tries Again to Update Voting System," Patriot Ledger, Nov. 8, 1996p. 1; Julie Fields, "Town OKs New Voting System;
Weymouth Drops Punch Card Ballots," Patriot Ledger, Nov. 13, 1996, p. 1; Eric Niiler, "Galvin Vows End to Punch-Card
Voting," Patriot Ledger, Feb. 19, 1997, p. 10; "Galvin Ready to Ban Punch Card Ballots," Patriot Ledger, Apr. 8, 1997, p. 16;
Colin Haley, "Punch-card Ballots Are Going Out; Must Be Replaced before September," Patriot Ledger, Oct. 24, 1997, p. 16;
John H. Boit, "Legislature OKs $2M for Voting Machines," Patriot Ledger, Dec. 19, 1997, p. 6; John H. Boit, "No More Punch
Card Voting," Patriot Ledger, May 20, 1998, p. 1. 
18 Delahunt v. Johnston, 671 N.E. 2d 1241.
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residual vote is the fraction of votes in a race that are
disqualified as overvotes (i.e., too many votes cast) 
or undervotes (no vote cast). Although this measure
combines intentional abstentions with inadvertent
voter mistakes, it has come to be used nationwide by
policymakers and scholars in comparing the relative
performance of different technologies and
jurisdictions.19
Our previous research indicates that in the 2000
presidential election fewer votes were lost in
Massachusetts due to the shortcomings of voting
machines than in the rest of the nation. The residual
vote rate in Massachusetts during the 2000 presi-
dential election was 1.1% of all ballots cast for
president compared to the nationwide residual 
vote rate of 1.9%. 
Table 3 reports the residual vote rate for president,
governor, and senator for all Massachusetts elections
since 1990. Note that the residual vote rates for
governor and senator tend to be higher than that 
for president. This is
due to differential
abstention rates among
voters considering
these races—voters 
are especially loathe 
to blank their ballots
for president, and are
much more likely to
abstain for the less
prominent state offices.
Residual vote rates 
also are much higher
whenever there is 
only one major party
candidate on the ballot,
as occurred in 2002 in
the case of U.S. senator,
Attorney General, and
Auditor. However, the
higher residual vote rates for “down ballot” offices 
are also due to confusion and mistakes caused by the
interfaces of the different voting technologies.
Not only does the residual vote rate in Massachusetts
vary across types of races, but it also varies across
types of voting equipment. This is illustrated in Table
4, which shows the residual vote rate for president,
governor, and senator, broken down by the type 
of machine used in different communities in
Massachusetts since 1990. Among the more 
prominent races, mechanical lever machines have
tended to produce lower residual vote rates than 
the alternatives.
Before they were banned in Massachusetts in the late
1990s, punch cards of the sort that became infamous 
in Palm Beach County, Florida—“Votomatics”—were
also the worst performers in Massachusetts. Table 4
masks this fact, since it combines the residual vote
rates for two types of punch cards that have been 
used in Massachusetts—Votomatics, like those used 
in Florida, and “DataVote” cards, which are not
perforated. In the 1996 presidential election, for
instance, the residual vote rate for municipalities 
in Massachusetts that used Votomatics was 3.6%,
compared to DataVote towns with a residual vote 
rate of 1.5%. The apparent improvement in the
performance of punch cards in Massachusetts since
1996 is entirely due to the banning of the Votomatic
devices. Nonetheless, as a general matter, the DataVote
devices perform more poorly than paper, mechanical
lever machines, and optical scanning.
The fact that Massachusetts banned punch cards 
after 1996 had a salutary effect that has often gone
overlooked: The localities that were required to give
up punch cards gravitated to optical scan technologies,
which had much lower residual vote rates. Therefore,
voters who might otherwise have voted in 2000 on the
poorest-performing voting machines instead used the
most reliable of the automated voting technologies. 
As a consequence, we estimate that 20,000 more votes
19 Operationally, what we term “residual vote” is the same as the term “blank ballots” used in Massachusetts election
statistics. We use the more generic “residual vote” phrase in this report because the phrase “blank ballots” is a misnomer.
“Blank ballots” in Massachusetts include over-voted ballots, plus ballots that were not read by scanning equipment but
were, in fact, marked by a voter. In trying to reform election technologies, it is misleading to assume that uncounted ballots
are solely due to a conscious decision by voters to abstain, which is implied by the term “blank ballots.” 
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were actually counted
in Massachusetts for
president in 2000 as 
a direct consequence 
of this switch from
Votomatics to optical
scan machines. Because
performance differences
between optical scan
equipment and
Votomatics in recording
votes for governor
were not so great, the banning of Votomatics had
practically no impact in recovering “lost votes” in 
the gubernatorial races of 1998 and 2002.
Because of the post-1996 reform that banned punch
cards and the Bay State’s above average equipment
performance, Massachusetts, unlike many other states
in the country, did not undertake significant election
reform following the 2000 election.20
The superior performance of Massachusetts on the
residual vote measure, compared with the rest of the
nation, rests largely on the banning of Votomatics in
1996, but not entirely. Massachusetts tends to perform
1–11/2 percentage points better on the residual vote
measure, compared to nationwide averages, with all of
the voting technologies currently used in the Bay State.
This suggests there are systematic factors outside of
voting technologies, per se, such as common adminis-
trative practices, that lead to more successful voting in
Massachusetts overall than the national average.
Still, there is one performance issue related to voting
machines in Massachusetts that has gone virtually
unnoticed: lever machines are especially poor
performers when it comes to ballot questions. This is
illustrated in Table 5, which reports the residual vote
rate of “Question 1” in each statewide election since
1990, broken down by voting technology. Boston, with
its antiquated lever machines in 2002, saw 27% of its
voters fail to record a vote for Question 1, compared to
14% in Worcester and 11% in Springfield—cities with
similar set of demographics, but ones with optically
scanned ballots.
This poor performance on statewide questions also
extends down to performance in local questions. This
is illustrated in Table 6, which reports the residual vote
rate for local ballot questions in 2002, broken down 
by the ballot type. Although local factors no doubt
influence the residual vote rates of local ballot
questions, the consistently high residual vote rate
among lever machine communities across question
types is strong evidence that many voters in these
communities are not having their opinions counted 
on important local matters.
There are two major problems with lever machines
recording votes on ballot questions. First, the
requirement that the text of ballot propositions be
present in the voting machine, coupled with the
requirement that the text be in two languages in some
cities, has resulted in the propositions being printed in
font sizes that are illegible. Second, ballot propositions
are high up in the machine, where many voters simply
overlook them. In one of the rare scientific studies of
voting machine usage by typical voters, one researcher
observed voters having to stand on their tiptoes to
read ballot questions and vote on them; many other
voters in this experiment simply failed to see the
questions in the first place.21
RECOMMENDATION # 11. Massachusetts should
decertify mechanical lever machines and DataVote
punch cards.
Cities like Boston cannot get rid of the mechanical
lever machines fast enough. Indeed, Boston is
planning on doing precisely that. The other cities and
towns that currently use lever machines should
quickly follow suit. (Within the Boston metropolitan
area, these municipalities include Newton, Waltham,
20 Election Reform Information Project, Election Reform Since November 2001: What’s Changed, What Hasn’t, and Why?, 
p. 55. Available at http://www.electionline.org/site/docs/pdf/2002annualreport.pdf. See also, Katharine Q. Seelye and
David E. Rosenbaum, “The 2002 Campaign: The Process,” New York Times, October 28, 2002, Monday, Late Edition, p. 1.
21 Susan King Roth, “Disenfranchised by Design: Voting Systems and the Election Process,” Information Design Journal (1998)
vol. 9, no. 1 (reprint; no pagination).
…lever machines are
especially poor
performers when 
it comes to 
ballot questions.
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and Everett.) Doing so will be expensive, but federal
funds will be available through the HAVA, on a
formula basis, to bear the lion’s share of the cost of this
upgrade. Our prior research and work with vendors
suggests that the total cost to convert municipalities
from lever machines to optical scanning machines will
be approximately $4 million. Our analysis of HAVA
provisions suggests that the federal government will
share over $1 million of the cost.
RECOMMENDATION # 12. Massachusetts should
change the election laws that make it virtually
impossible to certify direct register electronic voting
machines in the state.
Local governments in Massachusetts are responsible for
purchasing or leasing and maintaining the equipment
used within their city or town, but the Secretary of State
certifies the type of technology and the exact models
that may be purchased.22 The Secretary’s certification
duties include monitoring the performance of approved
voting equipment.
Over the past two decades, there have been significant
developments in fully computerizing voting machines—
creating machines that are often compared to ATMs. In
our report Voting: What Is/What Could Be, we criticize
much of the first generation of these Direct Recording
Electronic (DRE) designs, for many reasons: they often
reflect poor user interfaces, provide no opportunity 
for independent paper-based audit, and are built on
proprietary software. As a whole, the current set of
DREs being used across America is no better than the
lower-tech optical scanning equipment. Touch screen
voting is no panacea for election machine woes.
Data from the 2000 election showed that DREs had a
rather high residual vote rate nationwide (2.5 percent
for president and 5.5 percent for Senate and governor).23
Press reports suggest that DREs showed improved
performance in Florida and Georgia during the 2002
midterm elections. However, neither state has yet to
release data sufficient to scientifically assess how
DREs performed in
those states; it is quite
likely that much of the
improved performance
in Georgia and Florida
was due to the
unsustainably high
degree of scrutiny 
and vendor support
associated with the
2002 equipment 
roll-outs.
Nonetheless, social
forces are pushing
Massachusetts in a
direction that will
demand the Commonwealth to make DREs available
to its citizens. If nothing else, HAVA explicitly requires
that every precinct in the state have at least one DRE,
for use by disabled voters, by January 1, 2006. (This
will require a one-time expenditure of approximately
$6 million, most of which could be borne by the
federal government.) In addition, many DREs 
have added features that are attractive to citizens 
and election administrators in our increasingly
complicated age. DREs can accommodate more ballot
styles and more languages than traditional paper-
based systems. And DREs save tremendously on
printing charges.
Up to this point there have been good reasons to
exclude DREs from Massachusetts, but the fact is 
that DREs have been forbidden for the wrong reason—
an abstruse provision in Massachusetts election law
requires voting machines to allow the address of
write-in candidates to be entered on the machine, not
just the name. This is hardly a good reason to exclude
a technology that holds such promise.
Massachusetts may not be able to wait for the perfect
electronic voting machine, however. The argument
made by the disability community in favor of the
adoption of DRE machines—even highly flawed
machines—is compelling. Even imperfect DREs
22 Mass. Gen. L., ch. 54, § 32. 
23 Voting: What Is/What Could Be, p. 21.
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developments in fully
computerizing voting
machines—creating
machines that are often
compared to ATMs.
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currently provide the only way for visually impaired
voters, for instance, to cast an independent vote. The
trick will be for the Commonwealth to certify current-
generation DREs in such a way that encourages
localities to upgrade their equipment once
improvements are made in the next generation.
RECOMMENDATION # 13. Localities should be
encouraged to lease, not buy, new voting equipment.
Localities nationwide have been painted into a 
corner when buying voting machines. Regarded as 
an investment with an
infinite lifetime, voters
in towns and counties
across the nation have
found themselves
stuck voting on
dinosaurs that 
function poorly. One
under-appreciated
consequence of how
localities purchase
voting machines is 
that the voting
technology industry
has largely stagnated
and failed to innovate,
since its customers
tend to make major
purchases rarely, and
then try to keep their
archaic equipment
running for decades.
In the 1990s our
neighbor, Rhode
Island, tried to escape this cycle by entering into a
statewide contract to lease new (optical scanning)
voting equipment, rather than purchase it. Localities
in Massachusetts facing the prospect of acquiring
new equipment should also consider leasing, if for 
no other reason than localities should not foreclose
the opportunity to upgrade equipment in the next
decade, as innovations are made. The Commonwealth
could help this along tremendously by arranging for
a master lease under which localities could procure
equipment. (This may be the only practical way for
the smallest of towns to reasonably afford to acquire
and maintain DREs.)
RECOMMENDATION # 14. Massachusetts should
change the interpretation of its election laws so that
optical scan voting equipment can better inform
voters that they have over-voted a ballot.
Most Massachusetts towns now use optically scanned
ballots. A nationally-recognized “best practice” in the
use of these scanners is to: (1) have the ballots scanned
in the individual precincts, at the time the ballot is 
cast by the voter; and (2) to set the scanner such that 
it “spits back” any ballot that is “over-voted” (i.e.,
contains more votes for an office than are allowed).
Massachusetts requires neither practice—indeed, it
prohibits it. This undoubtedly leads to thousands 
of lost votes each Election Day, due to voter error.
Precinct scanning is clearly superior to “central
scanning” of ballots because it is harder to damage 
or lose ballots in transport. Massachusetts allows its
towns to scan ballots either way. The state should
insist that all users of optical scanning technologies
adopt in-precinct scanning.
The most common error that voters make on optically
scanned ballots is to inadvertently over-vote. Most
optical scanners can be set to return such ballots to 
the voter, at least to verify that this was the voter’s
intention. If over-voting was not the voter’s intention,
she or he can be given a new ballot to complete,
according to the state law. This feature gives voters an
opportunity to correct a mistake that would otherwise
disqualify their vote. In our larger research we have
identified this “failsafe” provision as an obvious
feature to protect voters against errors; many
localities around the country have moved to adopt
this feature—even some counties in Illinois that
continue to use punch cards. 
The Secretary of State of Massachusetts, however,
prohibits the use of the “spit-back” because this
feature allows a machine to spoil a ballot, and under
Massachusetts law only a voter may spoil a ballot.24
This is a curious interpretation of state law since, 
for instance, automatic lockout mechanisms in
Localities in
Massachusetts facing 
the prospect of acquiring
new equipment should 
also consider leasing, if
for no other reason than
localities should not
foreclose the opportunity
to upgrade equipment in
the next decade, as
innovations are made. 
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mechanical lever
machines serve
essentially the same
purpose, as do
programming features
of DREs. This
interpretation should
be changed to reflect
the nationwide best
practice concerning
optically scanned
ballots.
Such a change is
required under the
HAVA, in any case.
Massachusetts voters would be well served by
having the state adopt this practice sooner rather
than later.
RECOMMENDATION # 15. Massachusetts should
move expeditiously to develop a statewide task force
to establish a state plan for the improvement of
voting technologies.
Massachusetts has used a piecemeal approach to
voting equipment certification and improvements, 
but such an approach is neither wise nor possible, 
with the passage of the Help America Vote Act of 2002.
To receive federal funding for voting equipment, the
Secretary of State will be required to develop a state
plan through a committee of election officials,
stakeholders (including representatives of disability
groups), and other citizens. The state would then be
responsible for disbursing the funding to purchasing
authorities. HAVA, therefore, affords the Secretary of
State a new pro-active role in determining what voting
technology should be used in the state. 
Even without the requirements of HAVA prodding it,
the Commonwealth would do well to constitute a
statewide commission to draft a long-range strategic
plan for its voting technologies. It is ironic that while
Massachusetts has prided itself as being the home of
much of the digital revolution, its voting technologies
and practices have tended to be anti-revolutionary.
With greater public attention to the quality of the
Commonwealth’s voting technologies, and to 
the technological development in this area, the
Commonwealth could once again emerge as a 
leader in ensuring that every vote counts.
The Secretary of State is currently constructing such a
task force. It is important that this group gets to work
quickly, and that it spend great effort to publicize its
fact-finding.
…the Commonwealth
would do well to 
constitute a statewide
commission to draft a
long-range strategic 
plan for its 
voting technologies
24 The spoiled ballot statute reads: If a voter spoils a ballot, he may obtain two others, one at a time, upon returning each
spoiled one, and all ballots so returned shall immediately be marked by an election officer "Spoiled." Mass. Gen. L. ch. 54, §
81. This ruling arguably contradicts the regulation that requires voting equipment to give special regard to the “prevention
and detection of double voting” 950 CMR §50:02(2)(f).
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According to the 2000 U.S. Census, 2.8
percent of registered voters who did not
vote in the last presidential election
attributed their non-voting to long lines
or short polling place hours. What we
find especially troubling about polling
place lines and closings is that voters
who have done everything right are
denied access to the vote. Voters who register, study
the choices, make the effort to go to the polls, and
arrive on time can be denied the vote because of
unusually long lines at the very end of the day.
In Massachusetts, long lines and short hours are less of
a problem than nationally. Only 1.2% of Massachusetts
non-voters in 2000 claimed that long lines or
inconvenient hours kept them from voting. This works
out to over 15,000 voters in 2000 failing to vote for this
reason. However, coupled with the registration
problems that voters face, that we have previously
discussed, and which are usually encountered in
polling places, the administration of polls could still 
be improved in the Bay State.
Over 2.7 million Massachusetts voters turned out
during the 2000 presidential election. Many voters no
doubt came to the precinct, quickly checked in, voted,
and then checked out. Others weren’t so lucky. A letter
to the editor of the Boston Globe from a Shrewsbury
voter reflected another experience: 
I drove to my polling place at 9:45 a.m. 
Tuesday and found a line so long I was sure 
I would not get through it before I had to be 
at work. When I returned at 7:15 p.m., the line 
was even longer. It took 55 minutes before 
I was able to vote, a one-minute process. 
Even worse, I then had to wait more than 
five minutes before my name was checked 
a second time and my ballot accepted.25
This unhappy Bay State voter was
relatively fortunate. Some Boston
polling sites remained opened well past
8:00 p.m. to allow voters who were in
lines that snaked onto sidewalks to
vote.26 In other states, the backups were
far worse, including five hour waits
reported in Dekalb County, Georgia.27
It is difficult to find an undertaking in the public or
private sector comparable to polling place operations
on Election Day. So much depends on 13 hours of
continuous nationwide service. Polling place set-up is a
logistical challenge. Polling place can handle up to 1,000
actual voters on Election Day. Many of these voters
carry out this task just once every two-to-four years. 
The polling place is a service system—it provides the
service of voting. The voter is the customer with
certain requirements. Namely, the voter wants to cast
his or her vote accurately, privately, with minimal
wait, and with no hassles. The mission of the polling
place should be to satisfy its customers, spending the
minimal number of resources needed to do so. 
In our examination of voting, nationwide and in
Massachusetts, we have been struck with the number
of times voters and election officials complained about
problems associated with running polling places.
Voters complain about inconvenient hours and
uninformed poll workers. Election officials complain
about the logistics of mobilizing for Election Day and
the difficulties associated with finding competent poll
workers. Election officials nationwide are looking for
better ways of staffing precincts, as are officials in
Massachusetts. Polling place practices are unlikely to
improve very much in Massachusetts, however,
without the Commonwealth stepping in to change key
features of how elections are actually administered.
25 Boston Globe, p. A18, November 9, 2000, Letter from Peter Wysocan, Shewsbury. 
26 Steve Marantz, Boston Herald, “ELECTION 2000; Poll sites go into overtime” November 8, 2000, p. 10 
27 Will Anderson, Atlanta Journal and Constitution, November 11, 2000, “NAACP calls for changes at polls; Long lines, voters
turned away in southeast DeKalb County could lead to firing of workers,” p. 3H
Polling Place Practices
The mission of the polling
place should be to satisfy
its customers…
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If you ask a Massachusetts election official what his 
or her biggest headache running elections is, you 
are likely to hear two words: “poll workers.” Local
election officials are responsible for appointing six-to-
twelve Election Officers for each precinct on Election
Day. With more than 2,000 precincts in Massachusetts,
this works out to more than 12,000 volunteers who
need to be recruited for each statewide election.
Lining up a sufficient number of polling place workers
on Election Day isn’t just a problem of numbers; it is
also a problem of quality. This isn’t to say that the
thousands of election workers aren’t up to the task. 
It is to say that election officials are finding it
increasingly difficult to recruit a sufficient number 
of people who are
willing to work the
long hours, under
often-stressful
conditions,
implementing
increasingly 
complex election 
law. The current
system is headed 
for a meltdown.
We have learned of
innovative ways that
local officials use to
recruit high-quality
election workers. For
instance, the City of
Cambridge asks its
residents on the annual
census form whether
they would like to
work the polls on Election Day. This has produced a
surplus of potential poll workers for the Cambridge
Elections Commission.
Still, cities and towns mostly struggle under the
constraints of state election law in staffing the polls 
on Election Day. To assist local officials implement the
thankless task of running elections, the Commonwealth
should change some of these laws.
RECOMMENDATION # 16. Massachusetts should
abolish the requirement that election officials 
be registered to vote in the town or city where 
they work.
The requirement that polling officials be registered
voters within that municipality stems from the days
when the primary guard against voting fraud was a
neighbor eyeballing everyone who requested a ballot.
This is a quaint view of ensuring the integrity of
elections that no longer squares with reality. Almost
half of Massachusetts voters move in the four years
between successive federal and state elections. In our
highly mobile society, relying on election officials to
personally know all of a precinct’s registered voters is
a thin reed on which to rest the integrity of the ballot.
At the same time, a number of innovations have been
suggested to help grant greater flexibility to local
election officials in administering polling places, all of
which could require the use of precinct workers who
live in another town. Some of these innovations have
been used in other states with great success. Others 
are good ideas that need to be tried. None of these
innovations—which we also recommend—can be used
in Massachusetts unless state election law is changed.
RECOMMENDATION # 17. All levels of government in
Massachusetts should grant its employees a paid day
of leave if they agree to work as an election official
on Election Day.
RECOMMENDATION # 18. Cities and towns should 
be encouraged to use municipal clerical employees
as polling place workers on Election Day.
The biggest challenge on Election Day is recruiting
workers with a high degree of clerical skill to work 
the polls. The cities and towns of Massachusetts, along
with the state government, have an army of workers
who are highly skilled at clerical tasks and are already
adept at handling questions from the public about
basic questions of law. Many of these people would
gladly volunteer on Election Day to help run the polls.
Some towns already allow their workers to take a
vacation day to do this. However, we believe that the
…election officials are
finding it increasingly
difficult to recruit a
sufficient number of
people who are willing 
to work the long hours,
under often-stressful
conditions, implementing
increasingly 
complex election law.
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administration of the
polls is important
enough to actively
encourage municipal
and state workers to
help out. Not requiring
workers to take
vacation time to work
at the polls would be 
a low-cost statement
about the importance
of ensuring that
elections are
administered as well 
as humanly possible.
Encouraging local
government employees to staff precincts on Election
Day has already been used throughout the country, to
great success. Los Angeles County, California has a
program to encourage not only government workers,
but also elected officials, to staff the polls on Election
Day. Orange County, Florida places county workers
with computer skills in each of its precincts, allowing
the county to outfit each precinct with state-of-the-art
computers to run each precinct.
Although we also endorse using high school and
college students to help run polls on Election Day,
local election administrators have told us that they
value continuity and experience in their poll workers.
The best way to encourage this characteristic among
poll workers is to treat it as a professional position,
perhaps as an extension of one’s own public
employment.
RECOMMENDATION # 19. Cities and towns should be
encouraged to use students as polling place workers
on Election Day.
Some states have begun allowing high school and 
non-resident college students to help staff the polls.
This practice is attractive for a number of reasons.
Practically speaking, high schools and colleges
increasingly have public service programs and
requirements, and so there is already a willing army 
of potential poll workers among these ranks. Thinking
long-term, many people are concerned about the
diminished civic involvement of adolescents and
young adults. Enlisting young people to work the
polls on Election Day, even when they are not
themselves registered voters, may encourage their
civic participation in the future.
Section 501 of the Help America Vote Act establishes
the Help America Vote College Program, aimed at
encouraging college students to assist at polling
places. It also establishes the Help America Vote
Foundation to encourage high school students to assist 
at polling places. Although it will be at least a year
until these programs are fully functional, they will
provide programmatic and financial assistance in
helping to implement such a recommendation.
As we have previously noted, our conversations with
local election official suggest that they would prefer to
rely on local professionals with the necessary public
service and clerical skills, who would lend greater
continuity to the staffing of polls, in recruiting poll
workers. However, some officials may want to
experiment with the use of local students, and they
should not be hindered from doing so by state laws
that restrict such assistance to registered voters.
RECOMMENDATION # 20. Massachusetts should
issue statewide voter registration cards every two
years, as a method to educate voters about where
they should vote.
Massachusetts can make sure each voter knows where
his or her polling place is located by issuing statewide
voter registration cards. The state’s Central Voter
Registry affords city and town clerks, and even the
Secretary of State, the ability to issue such cards.
Registration cards should become part of the
preparations for every biennial state election, not 
just those occurring after the decennial United 
States Census or a change in polling place locations. 
The State Election Division should also undertake a
public information campaign to let people know when
they should expect a registration card and what to do
if they do not receive one. Furthermore, an incentive
can be given for using registration cards on Election
Day—you go to a shorter queue if you bring your
registration card.
Encouraging local
government employees 
to staff precincts on
Election Day has already
been used throughout 
the country, 
to great success. 
20 U n d e r s t a n d i n g  B o s t o n
RECOMMENDATION # 21. The state and
municipalities should work more diligently 
to ensure accessibility to polling places for 
disabled voters. 
With the national spot light on election reform in 
2000, advocates for disabled voters rallied to educate
election officials and lawmakers in Washington about
longstanding problems with voting accessibility for
disabled voters. Massachusetts is one of the states with
woefully inadequate
access to its nearly 
one quarter million
disabled voters. 
The principle
accommodations 
made to disabled 
voters under
Massachusetts law 
are the right to request
assistance with voting
and the absentee ballot process. The right of disabled
voters to get assistance with voting is, on its face, an
effort to allow all voters to cast votes no matter their
ability, but it is a remedy that denies disabled voters,
especially visually impaired voters, the right to a secret
ballot. The absentee ballot process creates the same
problem for visually disabled voters who must rely on
another person to read and complete the ballot, not to
mention apply for and collect the ballot from the mail
for the voter.
HAVA brings important reforms to disabled voters
and requires states such as Massachusetts to give
disabled voters access to a secret ballot. As of 2006, 
at the latest, every polling place in the United States
must include a manner of voting that allows disabled
voters, including the blind, “…the same opportunity
for access and participation (including privacy and
independence) as for other voters.”28
We expect that there will be continued debate as to
what constitutes the same “opportunity for access 
and participation” for disabled voters. The voting
equipment industry has made some progress
developing machines that are usable by visually
impaired voters. Many new DREs offer recorded
instructions on how to vote. This represents a very
important advance, but we know of no studies of 
the performance of these machines. We strongly
recommend human testing of equipment for errors in
voting and ease-of-use of equipment accessible to blind
voters, and HAVA will direct funding to such research.
New interface designs and machine architectures 
may be needed to solve accessibility for visually
impaired voters and for voters who need assistance
reading English. Our recommendation is for the
Commonwealth to refrain from making a long term
commitment to any single technology to meet the
requirements of HAVA, but to develop a flexible
acquisition plan that affords disabled voters their right
to a secret ballot, and also preserves the accuracy of
those votes.
The discussion of polling place practices thus far has
confined itself to traditional Election Day voting in
physical precincts. It has not dealt with the other major
method of voting in the Commonwealth, absentee
voting, or emerging methods of voting in other states,
such as early voting and mailing-in ballots.
Massachusetts has one of the most conservative
absentee ballot laws in the United States. One
consequence of this is that 5% of ballots cast in
Massachusetts in 2000 were cast absentee, compared 
to 10% nationwide. In 2000, one state, Oregon, cast its
ballots entirely by mail, and six other states (Arizona,
Colorado, Nevada, Tennessee, Texas, and Washington)
saw more than one-quarter of their ballots cast before
Election Day.
Massachusetts has resisted this nationwide movement
toward early voting and more liberalized absentee
voting. Massachusetts is one of a dwindling number 
of states that still allows absentee ballots to be used
only “for cause.” (The allowable causes include such
things as traveling on Election Day, residing in another
community on Election Day, and being in a hospital 
on Election Day.)
From the perspective of maintaining the integrity 
of the ballot, this resistance to proliferating mail-in
28 H.R. 3295, Help America Vote Act, Title 1, §261. 
Massachusetts is one of
the states with woefully
inadequate access to its
nearly one quarter million
disabled voters. 
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ballots is laudable.
Absentee ballots are
not fundamentally
secret ballots; the few
election fraud cases
that have been
publicized in recent
years across the nation
have tended to be
related to the abuse 
of absentee ballots.
However, the current
Massachusetts course 
is unsustainable,
practically speaking.
First, voters are
increasingly expecting
that voting should be 
as convenient as other
services. If you can buy
a book online or download your favorite music, why
can’t you at least have you ballot mailed to you, for you
to return by mail?29 Voting absentee is more convenient
to many voters, many of whom will feign a legitimate
excuse in order to be mailed an absentee ballot.
Second, other states with “for cause” absentee ballot
laws have seen those laws crumble in the face of
determined political strategies that exploit the
inconsistent implementation of absentee ballot laws
across a state. One good example was Florida in 2000.
Although Florida’s absentee ballot law restricted
absentee ballots in a way similar to Massachusetts,
Republican Party operatives in a few counties, most
notably Seminole County, generated thousands of
requests for absentee ballots among registered
Republicans. These requests, which violated the spirit
(and probably the letter) of Florida’s absentee ballot
law, came to light when many of the absentee ballots
failed to conform to the prescribed legal form, but
were nonetheless counted in Florida’s close
presidential election.
It is only a matter of time before a campaign pursues 
a similar absentee ballot strategy in Massachusetts.
Perhaps it has already happened. Once such a strategy
is pursued and publicized, the legitimacy of an
election may be thrown into doubt. The problem at
that point will also be, however, that a number of
voters will have discovered that absentee ballots 
can be more convenient than going to a precinct on
Election Day, and will continue to demand to vote
absentee for convenience in the future.
RECOMMENDATION # 22. The Massachusetts
Secretary of State should biennially report the
number of absentee ballots cast in each election, 
by town, in Public Document 43.
The number of absentee ballots cast in each
municipality in the Commonwealth is unknown to 
the general public. Therefore, it is difficult to know
whether some towns and cities are more liberal in their
implementation of the current absentee voting laws. 
In addition, should a campaign or party committee 
adopt a strategy that circumvents the current “for
cause” absentee ballot requirement, no one would
know, since the number of absentee ballots cast in each
town is not widely reported. Therefore, in the interest of
helping to maintain the integrity of the Massachusetts
absentee ballot laws, the number of absentee ballots cast
in each town must be collected and regularly reported
by the state.
RECOMMENDATION # 23. Massachusetts should
adopt early voting options.
The pressure nationwide to accommodate more
complicated modern lives in voting practices has led
many states to expand absentee balloting unwisely. 
The elections system in Massachusetts will increasingly
feed the pressure to make voting more convenient. 
Absentee ballots are not
fundamentally secret
ballots; the few election
fraud cases that have
been publicized in 
recent years across 
the nation have tended
to be related to the 
abuse of 
absentee ballots.
29 In this report we avoid discussing one of the hottest topics in election reform, Internet voting, which may be the ultimate 
in convenience voting. As a general method of voting, using the Internet or other electronic modes that allow voting from
home is still fraught with perils. It is a method that has already been used in Europe and with United States armed forces.
As a method of accommodating many disabled voters, it may quickly emerge as a best practice in accessibility. However,
Internet voting is too much in its infancy to address at length here. 
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A better way to make
voting more convenient
is not to liberalize
absentee balloting, but
to encourage in-person
early voting, as has
been done in a number 
of states.
Convenience voting is
on the rise nationwide.
Two decades ago only
four percent of ballots
were cast absentee or
early nationwide;
today that figure has
grown to 14 percent.
In the 1970s and 1980s,
states began experimenting with new types of voting
away from neighborhood precincts. These modes
formally share many characteristics with absentee
balloting, but have been implemented for new reasons:
namely, for the convenience of local residents who are
not out of town on Election Day. These techniques are
early voting and mail voting.
Early voting can be thought of as stretching Election
Day into an Election Period. States that have adopted
early voting provisions generally make their election
ballots available to all registered voters a couple of
weeks before Election Day. How and where votes are
cast varies. Most states allow voters to travel to the
county courthouse to vote in person, regardless of
where their neighborhood precinct is located. A few
states, notably Texas, allow the establishment of
satellite voting sites in government buildings and
public places like shopping malls. States with early
voting provisions in 2000 included Alaska, Arkansas,
Colorado, Kansas, Nevada, New Mexico, North
Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, Tennessee, and Texas.
The easiest way for Massachusetts to adopt early
voting is to amend the absentee ballot process to
permit anyone to vote absentee without an excuse if
they appear in person at the town clerk’s office or other
designated early polling site. The same procedures the
clerk uses to allow an absentee ballot to be sent to a
voter should be used to hand an absentee ballot to an
early in-person early voter. The voter record would be
updated similarly and the ballots would be delivered
to the precinct on Election Day along with the other
absentee ballots for processing. 
The other alternative to Election Day in-person voting
is voting by mail. It operates at the initiative of election
officials, who mail ballots to all registered voters, who
then return the ballots to the county court house (in
the case of Massachusetts, it would be sent to the
town hall), most often by mail. In 2000, Oregon
became the first state to conduct its general election
entirely by mail. Currently at least sixteen states
(Alaska, California, Colorado, Florida, Kansas,
Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada,
New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Oregon, Utah,
and Washington) allow vote-by-mail in at least some
elections, although no other state has moved nearly as
far as Oregon.
In Voting: What Is/What Could Be, we discuss the many
problems associated with widespread mail-in voting.
Massachusetts would do well to steer clear of this
alternative.
A better way to make
voting more convenient 
is not to liberalize
absentee balloting, 
but to encourage 
in-person early voting, 
as has been done in 
a number of states.
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It is the responsibility of the Secretary
of State and local election officials to
guard the most sacred of democratic
rights of all Massachusetts citizens.
Election officials at all levels in
Massachusetts have worked tirelessly
for years to ensure that every vote
counts on Election Day. The fact that
much of the spotlight following the
2000 presidential election fell far away
from the Bay State is testimony to the
hard work and diligence of these
officials.
Still, voting is far from perfect in
Massachusetts. Too many voters are
confused on Election Day about where
they should vote and how to register.
Too many voters use antiquated voting
machines that lead directly to lost
votes. Too few poll workers can be
recruited to provide the vitally
important service of staffing polling
places. And too many voters find
voting too inconvenient.
Reforming elections in Massachusetts
will require the amassing of financial
resources and the political will necessary to overcome
decades of entrenched administrative practice, so 
that Massachusetts voters have their voting rights
protected as effectively as any place in this country.
The need for focused leadership in this area leads us 
to our final recommendation.
RECOMMENDATION # 24. The Secretary of State
should act quickly to appoint a permanent director
of the state Elections Division.
The directorship of the Elections Division has been
vacant for a number of years. Although the incumbent
Secretary of State has proven to be dedicated to the
cause of effective elections, there is no substitute for a
political leader whose sole responsibility is ensuring
that the conduct of Massachusetts
elections is second to none. Although
many of the recommendations we have
suggested will be facilitated through 
the promise of federal funds, others 
will require the changing of long-time
election practices. It is our experience
that the states that have been the most
progressive in pursuing election reform
have had a progressive political leader
augmenting the Secretary of State’s
efforts, relentlessly prodding the state
toward reform. Election reform will not
happen by itself. Executive leadership,
along with strong activity by the
legislature, is a necessary condition 
for reform.
Conclusion
Reforming elections in
Massachusetts will 
require the amassing 
of financial resources 
and the political will
necessary to overcome
decades of entrenched
administrative practice, 
so that Massachusetts
voters have their voting
rights protected as
effectively as any place 
in this country. 
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Summary of the Help America Vote Act of 2002
The contested 2000 presidential race exposed deep weaknesses in the nation’s system for administering elections.
Almost immediately following that election, Congress began to debate what the federal government should do to
fix the system before the next presidential election in 2004. The result was the swift passage of a sweeping reform
billed called The Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA). The bill calls for up to $3.9 billion in spending by the
federal government over the next three years on a mix of grant programs to help improve election systems for
federal elections. 
This appendix contains four sections that summarize the Help America Vote Act of 2002 and relate provisions of
the Act to current Massachusetts practices.
Massachusetts Share of HAVA Funding
Many doubted whether HAVA would be fully funded this year. However, the Omnibus FY 2003 Continuing
Resolution (H.J. Res. 2) that was passed February 13 contained a $1.5 billion line item for HAVA. Nearly 
$80 million could flow to the Massachusetts election system over the next three years if HAVA is fully funded
every year and Massachusetts elects to participate.
The first type of HAVA funding, Title I funding, is a quick influx of money to the states to meet the immediate
improvements required under the act including acquiring accessible voting machinery and replacing all punch
cards and lever machines. (See Table A-1.) Massachusetts stands to receive anywhere from $6 to $7 million of the
$650 million directed toward funding the requirements of Title I. In order to obtain the funding, the state must
agree to comply with the requirements and deadlines of the act, which range from the 2004 to 2006 federal
elections. Massachusetts does not have to provide any matching funds for Title I funding.
The second type of HAVA funding, Title II funding, will be directed toward states for continued implementation
of the requirements of the act. (See Table A-2.) Title II funding requires each state to match 5% of the funding
supplied by the federal government with state funds. Massachusetts could receive up to $69 million of the $3
billion available under Title II of HAVA. The state would have to submit a plan setting forth how it intends to
comply with HAVA and contribute $3.45 million of state funds to participate. The remainder of HAVA funding 
is set aside for grants for accessibility improvements, research, and pilot programs. (See Table A-3.) 
Title III of HAVA institutes several requirements for voting systems, to be implemented in the immediate future.
Table A-4 summarizes those provisions, alongside an analysis of the degree to which Massachusetts currently
complies with those requirements.
Appendix
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TABLE A-1 
Title I Funding for Massachusetts in 2003
HAVA Grant Program Total U.S. (2003) Available to Massachusetts (2003)
Section 101 $325,000,000 Minimum $5,000,000
Funding to meet Title III Requirements Maximum $7,475,000*
by specified deadlines
Section 102 $325,000,000 $1,948,000#
Funding to Replace Punch Cards 
and Lever Machines
TOTAL: $650,000,000 Minimum $6,948,000
Maximum $9,423,000
* Massachusetts may apply for up to 2.3% of the total Section 101 funding, but a minimum of $5,000,000 will go to every state.
Massachusetts’s portion of the total funding is based on the voting age population (VAP) in the state, which is 2.3% if the
VAP of the US. VAP Source: US Census, Projections of the Population of Voting Age, for States, by Race, Hispanic Origin,
Sex, and Selected Ages: November 7, 2000, http://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/voting/proj00/tab01.txt
# HAVA will provide states with up to $4,000 per eligible precinct. Eligible precincts are those that used punch card or lever
machine voting systems during the 2000 election. According to state election officials, Massachusetts has 487 qualifying
precincts.
TABLE A-2 
Title II Funding for Massachusetts
Year Total US Maximum Federal $ Max State Matching Total Elections
Available to Mass.* Funds (5%) Funding in Mass.
2003 $1.4 billion $32,200,000 $1,610,000 $33,810,000
2004 $1 billion $23,000,000 $1,150,000 $24,150,000
2005 $600 million $13,800,000 $690,000 $14,490,000
TOTAL: $3 billion $69,000,000 $3,450,000 $72,450,000
* Massachusetts is eligible for up to 2.5% of the total. See note (*) accompanying Table A-1.
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TABLE A-3
Additional HAVA Funding*
Item 2003 2004 2005 2006 Total
To fund Election $10 million $10 million $10 million $30 million
Assistance Commission 
Access Grants# $50 million $25 million $25 million $100 million
Research Grants $20 million $20 million
Pilot Programs $10 million $10 million
P&A Systems## $10 million $10 million $10 million $10 million $40 million
Student/Parent $200,000* $200,000
Mock Elections 
Title V College Program $5 million* $5 million
Title VI High School Program $5 million* $5 million
TOTAL: $110 million $45 million $45 million $10 million $210 million
NB: This table is based on the Funding Table provided in the Florida Governor’s Select Task Force on Election Procedures,
Standards and Technology Report, December 30, 2002.
# Access grants will be administered by the US Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). 
## Protection and Advocacy Systems as defined in Section 102 of the Developmental Disabilities Assistance Bill of Rights
Act of 2000 (42 USC 15002). HHS will also administer these grants.
* Plus such sums as necessary for each succeeding fiscal year.
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HAVA - Title III Requirements Massachusetts Election System
VOTING SYSTEMS – Section 30130
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE HELP AMERICA VOTE ACT (HAVA) IN MASSACHUSETTS
Note: In this section, items that may require reform to comply with HAVA are indicated with shading. 
Items in which Massachusetts may already be in compliance are not shaded.
Note: The term “Voting Systems” refers to the equipment, such as optical
scanners or lever machines, that are used to capture, cast, count, and report
votes. (HAVA §301(b)(1)). Voting Systems must be certified by the
Secretary of State’s Election Division before they may be sold or used within
the Commonwealth. (Mass. Gen. L., ch. 54, §32; 950 CMR 50).31 Specific
brands of the following types of voting equipment are certified for use within
Massachusetts as of January, 2003:
■ Optically Scanned Paper Ballots
■ Hand Counted Paper Ballots
■ Lever Machines*
■ DataVote punch card systems* 
* HAVA funds the complete replacement of lever machines and punch card
systems, including DataVote. The comments in this chart assume that
Massachusetts will decertify lever and Data Vote systems upon the
implementation of HAVA. 
1. General Compliance
All voting systems must  
meet the following criteria:
30 All references to the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) are to Public Law 107-252 (107th Congress) and are cited in this chart
as HAVA § ___. The Act is also contained in the United States Code at 42 USC 15301.
31 This chart contains parenthetical references to applicable provisions of Massachusetts’s election law. The statutes
governing elections in Massachusetts are Chapters 50 through 57 of the Massachusetts General Laws and are cited
herein as Mass. G.L., Ch __, §__. The regulations governing elections in Massachusetts are Chapter 950 of the Code of
Massachusetts Regulations, Sections 48 – 60, and are cited herein as 950 CMR __.
A voting system that allows a voter to review or “go back” over the
ballot and see what or whom they voted for after making the selection
should meet this requirement. In Massachusetts, the two certified
paper-based voting systems permit voters to verify their selections. 
Massachusetts has yet to certify the newest type of voting machines,
Direct Recording Electronic devises (DRE’s), also called “touch screens”
or ATM-like voting machines. Some DRE’s may make verification of
selections difficult for voters. 
301(a)(1)(i)
Allow the voter to verify 
their selection. 
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Voters in Massachusetts may request up to 2 additional ballots to correct
spoiled ballots. (Mass. Gen. L., ch. 54, § 81)
301(a)(1)(ii)
Allow voter to change the ballot
or correct any error. 
Optical scan systems as certified in Massachusetts do not permit the
voter to correct an overvote. Pursuant to a ruling by the Secretary of
State, optical scan ballots may not be programmed to reject or “spit
back” ballots containing overvotes. 
Massachusetts standards for preventing overvotes are not specific
and require only that voting equipment give special regard to the
“prevention and detection of double voting”. (950 CMR
§50:02(2)(f)).32
The instructions accompanying absentee ballots issued by the
Secretary of State do not include instructions on how to get a
replacement for a spoiled ballot.
301(a)(1)(iii)
If the voter selects or votes for
more than 1 candidate (i.e.,
“overvotes”), notify the voter that
they have overvoted and provides
the voter with the opportunity to
correct the ballot before the ballot
is cast and counted. (For paper
ballots, central-scanned ballots
and absentee or mail-in ballots –
the requirement may be met with
a voter education program
specific to that voting system
including instructions for
correcting the ballot and 
ordering a replacement ballot). 
32 Lever Machines do prevent overvoting but these machines will be replaced under HAVA. 
2. Audit Capacity 
All voting systems must have
an audit trail that:
The optical scan paper-based ballot systems used in Massachusetts
produce a paper tape of the electronic count and the actual paper ballot
remains for a manual audit. 
301(a)(2)(B)(i)
Produces a permanent paper
record with a manual audit
capacity for such system. 
Voters in Massachusetts may request up to 2 additional ballots to correct
spoiled ballots before the ballot is cast. (Mass. Gen. L., ch. 54, § 81). 
The instructions on absentee ballots in Massachusetts do not inform
voters of spoiled ballot procedures.
301(a)(2)(B)(ii)
Provides voter with an opportunity
to change the ballot or correct any
error before the permanent paper
record is produced. 
For centrally scanned optically
scanned ballots and absentee or
mail-in ballots this requirement 
can be met with spoiled ballot
instructions. 
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Paper Ballots are retained for use in a recount. (Mass. Gen. L., ch. 54,
§§135, 135B.)
301(a)(2)(B)(iii)
The paper record is available as
an official record for any recount 
3. Accessibility of Voting
System for Individuals 
with Disabilities
This would be a new requirement in Massachusetts.
DRE machines, including those equipped with nonvisual accessibility
features, are not yet certified for use in the state.
301(a)(3)(A)
Every polling place has a DRE
system accessible for individuals
with disabilities, including
nonvisual accessibility for the
blind and visually impaired, in
a manner that provides the
same opportunity for access 
and participation (including
privacy and independence)
as for other voters.
Optically scanned paper ballots can be printed in alternative languages. 
Note: as of July, 2002, the following Massachusetts jurisdictions are required to
provide Spanish language ballots for Hispanic voters: Boston, Chelsea, Holyoke,
Lawrence, Southbridge, and Springfield. (28 CFR 55; Federal Register / Vol. 67, 
No. 144 / Friday, July 26, 2002.)
301(a)(4)
Complies with alternative
language accessibility pursuant to
the requirements of section 203 of
the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (42
U.S.C. 1973aa 1a)
4. Alternative Language
Accessibility
Massachusetts, like most states, voluntarily adopts the Voting 
System Standards issued by the FEC. (950 CMR 50:03(3)). 
301(a)(5)
Meets FEC voting system
standards error rate
5. Error Rates
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6. Uniform Definition of 
what Constitutes a Vote
The standard for interpreting what constitutes a vote in Massachusetts
is the “will of the voter”. Massachusetts has a well-settled body of case
law interpreting this standard and the standard applies across the state.
(See e.g., Delahunt v. Johnston, 671 NE.2d 1241 (Mass. 1996) Kane v.
Registrars of Voters, 328 Mass. 511, 105 N.E. 2d 212 (Mass. 1952); Munn
v. Dabrowski, 335 Mass. 41, 138 N.E. 2d 570 (Mass. 1956)).
The US Supreme Court’s 2000 decision in Bush v. Gore, cast some doubt
on the “will of the voter” standard. (Bush V. Gore, 121 S.Ct. 525 (2000)).
The Court found that voters had an equal protection right against
arbitrary and disparate treatment in recount procedures. This has led
some legal scholars to suggest that a “will of the voter” standard might
not survive an equal protection challenge. However, the facts before
the Court in Bush v. Gore were limited to the vote counting standards 
in the state of Florida in 2000. Florida, unlike Massachusetts, had no
statewide standards for interpreting voter intent in 2000 and very 
weak and limited case law precedent.
It is expected that the courts will refine this HAVA requirement.
301(a)(6)
The State has uniform and
nondiscriminatory standards
that define what constitutes a
vote and what will be counted
as a vote for each category of
voting system used in the State
Massachusetts has a limited provisional ballot called an Escrow Ballot.
Escrow ballots may be given to persons who are not on the voter list
and cannot be verified by an inquiry to the town clerk or registrar.
(Mass. Gen. L., ch. 51, §59A). The escrow ballot statute does not
expressly require that the ballot be offered. Poll worker guidelines,
however, instruct polls workers to offer escrow ballots.
302(a)(1)
Election official at the polling place
shall notify the individual that they
may cast a provisional ballot.
Section 302(a), Provision 
Ballot System
If a person’s name is not on the
voter list or is challenged, such
person can cast a provisional ballot
as follows:
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The affirmation for an escrow ballot is an oral oath administered by the
presiding election officer. (Mass. Gen. L., ch. 51, §59A and ch. 54, §85). 
302(a)(2)
The person may cast a provisional
ballot at that polling place upon the
execution of a written affirmation
by the individual before an election
official at the polling place stating
that the individual is — (A) a
registered voter in the jurisdiction
in which the individual desires to
vote; and (B) eligible to vote in 
that election.
Escrow ballots are not verified or counted unless “…the total number 
of escrow ballots may change the result of the election.” (Mass. Gen. L.,
ch. 51, §59A.
302(a)(3)
The election official shall promptly
take the ballot cast by the individual
or the voter information contained
in the written affirmation to an
appropriate State or local election
official for prompt verification. 
Escrow ballots are not counted unless the race is close. Mass. Gen. L.,
ch. 51, §59A.
302(a)(4)
If the appropriate State or local
election official determines that 
the individual is eligible under 
State law to vote, the individual's
provisional ballot shall be counted
as a vote in that election. 
This would be a new requirement in Massachusetts.
302(a)(5) (A)
When the ballot is cast the state 
or local official shall provide 
the individual with written
information on how they can 
find out if the ballot was cast.
This would be a new requirement in Massachusetts.
302(a)(5) (B)
There is a free access system (such
as a toll-free number or Internet
website) for such individuals to
confirm whether the vote was cast
or counted and if it was not, the
reason why not. 
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302(b)(1) & (2)
(A) a sample version of the ballot
that will be used for that election;
(B) information regarding the 
date of the election and the hours
during which polling places will 
be open;
(C) instructions on how to vote,
including how to cast a vote and
how to cast a provisional ballot
(D) instructions for mail-in
registrants and first-time voters
under section 303(b).
(E) general information on voting
rights under applicable Federal
and State laws, including
information on the right of an
individual to cast a provisional
ballot and instructions on how to
contact the appropriate officials if
these rights are alleged to have
been violated; and
(F) general information on Federal
and State laws regarding
prohibitions on acts of fraud and
misrepresentation.
Section 302(b), Voting
Information System
Requirements
32
(A) Polling places in Massachusetts must have 10 or more specimen
ballots on colored paper available. (Mass. Gen. L., ch.54,§48)
(B) Each town must publicly post the notice or warrant calling for the
election but there is no express requirement in Massachusetts law to
post the warrant at the polling place on Election Day even though
some municipalities may do this. (Mass. Gen. L., ch. 54, §§63, 64) 
(C) Polling places in Massachusetts must post “cards of instruction”
(Mass. Gen. L., ch. 54, §49). The provisional ballot instructions would
be a new requirement in Massachusetts.
(D) This would be a new requirement in Massachusetts.
(E) This would be a new requirement in Massachusetts, although
polling places currently must post instructions for voters for: (i)
obtaining ballots; (ii) marking ballots; (iii) obtaining assistance; and (iv)
obtaining replacements for spoiled ballots. (Mass. Gen. L., ch. 54, §48).
(F) Massachusetts law requires the posting of abstracts of laws
imposing penalties upon voters as they shall deem proper. (Mass. 
Gen. L., ch. 54, §48).
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VOTING REGISTRATION – Section 303
1. State-wide voter list
Massachusetts has a statewide voter list called the Central Voter
Registry (CRV). (Mass. Gen. L., ch. 51, § 47C and 950 CMR 58:00).
Note: Although Massachusetts, unlike many states, has already adopted a
statewide database system, there are two aspects of the CRV that warrant
improvement in light of HAVA. First, HAVA requires that the statewide
list be a “single” list. The Massachusetts CRV, as described by one election
official, is “book of separate chapters”. Each municipality keeps its own
list, which is held as a “chapter” in the CRV “book”. As a result, it is not
possible in the ordinary course of business to search the entire database
without knowing which municipality the voter is presently or was last
registered in.
Second, the CRV assigns each voter record a unique identifier that is based
on the person’s name and birth date. HAVA, as will be discussed below,
encourages states to adopts a unique identifier that is a number that
corresponds to another statewide database so that voter registration records
can be updated as these other databases get updated. For example, if the
unique identifier is the drivers license number, a change of address in the
record of a certain driver’s license number would automatically trigger a
change in address in the statewide voter registration database.
303 (a)(1)(A)
A single, uniform, official,
centralized, interactive
computerized statewide 
voter registration list defined,
maintained, and administered 
at the State level that contains 
the name and registration
information of every legally
registered voter in the State 
and assigns a unique identifier 
to each legally registered voter
in the State.
2. List Maintenance
Massachusetts’ safeguards conform to those outlined in the NVRA. 
Registrars may remove a name from the CRV for only the following
reasons: 
■ the voter has died;
■ the Registrar received a duplicate registration from another city
or town; 
■ the RMV sent the Registrar a change of address notice;
■ the voter has notified the town of a change in address or has
requested to be removed; or
■ the voter has not voted in two consecutive biennial elections
(usually a four-year period) and failed to respond to the annual
local census notice. 
(Mass. Gen. L., ch. 51, § 38.)
303 (a)(2)(A)
If an individual is to be removed
from the computerized list, such
individual shall be removed in
accordance with the provisions of
the National Voter Registration Act
of 1993 (42 U.S.C. 1973gg et seq.)
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All registered voters appear in the CRV. For list maintenance purposed,
the records are coded “A” for active voters and “I” for inactive. 
A local registrar may not remove a name from the list unless they no
longer meet the requirements for registration. (Mass. Gen. L., ch. 51,
§§38 and 1). 
Note: The Registry of Motor Vehicles and cities and towns are required to
forward change of address notices to the appropriate local registrar. (950
CMR 58) but some registrars complain that this system does not work well. 
303 (a)(2)(B)
List maintenance shall be
conducted in a manner that
ensures that (i) the name of
each registered voter appears
in the computerized list (ii)
only voters who are not
registered or who are not
eligible to vote are removed
from the computerized list; 
and (iii) duplicate names 
are eliminated from the
computerized list. 
3. Security
Massachusetts restricts the distribution of voter lists. (Mass. Gen. L., 
ch. 51, §57). Access to the CRV is limited to authorized users only
through a dedicated line. 
303 (a)(3)
State or local officials shall
provide adequate technological
security measures to prevent the
unauthorized access to the
computerized list.
A local registrar may remove a voter for the reasons set forth in Gen. L.
ch 51, §38. They must also notify the individual prior to a removal.
(Mass. Gen. L., ch. 51, § 38.) 
303 (a)(4)(A)
A system of file maintenance 
that makes a reasonable effort 
to remove registrants who are
ineligible to vote from the official
list of eligible voters. Under such
system, consistent with the
National Voter Registration Act 
of 1993 (42 U.S.C. 1973gg et seq.),
registrants who have not
responded to a notice and who
have not voted in 2 consecutive
general elections for Federal office
shall be removed from the official
list of eligible voters, except that no
registrant may be removed solely
by reason of a failure to vote. 
4. Minimum standard for
accuracy of state voter
registration records
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To ensure that eligible voters are not removed from the list,
Massachusetts utilizes both it’s annual local census (the “street list”) 
and a separate confirmation notice. (Mass. Gen. L., ch. 51, §37). If a 
voter does not return the town’s annual census card, then they are sent 
a confirmation notice. If they do not respond to that notice and fail to
vote in two consecutive federal elections, then their name will be
removed from the list. 
Note: While the state waits for two consecutive state or federal elections to pass
(usually a four year period) before removing a name, it will put the names of
those who failed to respond to the annual census and the confirmation notice 
on an inactive voter list. Persons on the inactive voters list are still officially
registered to vote but they will be asked at the polling place to prove (by
showing an ID) or attest to (by signing a form called “Certificate of Continuous
Residency”) their continued residency at the address on the list before they can
vote. The inactive voter lists and procedures can be confusing to voters and poll
workers alike. Massachusetts should consider streamlining this procedure to
expedite check-in on Election Day.
303 (a)(4)(B)
Safeguards to ensure that
eligible voters are not removed
in error from the official list of
eligible voters.
5. Verification of Registration
Information
This would be a new requirement.
303 (a)(5)(A)
The voter registration
application asks for drivers
license number of individuals
with such a license, last 4 digits
of social security number for
those without, and if registrant
has neither a drivers license
number nor social security
number, then the state assigns 
a unique numerical identifier. 
HAVA - Title III Requirements Massachusetts Election System
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The CRV does share information with the Registry of Motor Vehicles but
it is not clear whether the system in place meets this requirement.
Note: A key aspect of the structure of Massachusetts state government makes
database management between the Registry and the Elections Division a
challenge. In some states like Michigan, which is often cited as a model for
statewide voter registration database management, the Secretary of State 
is responsible for both issuing drivers licenses and voter registration and 
can easily develop compatible systems for both. In Massachusetts, however,
the Registry of Motor Vehicles falls under the Governor’s Office, which 
is a constitutionally separate department from the Secretary of State.
Massachusetts must, therefore, develop innovative ways to improve the
cooperation between these two separate departments. This may include
sharing resources and developing mutually beneficial systems.
303 (a)(5)(B)
State shall enter into an
agreement to match
information in the database 
of the statewide voter
registration system with
information in the 
database of the motor 
vehicle authority. 
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This would be a new requirement in Massachusetts.
303 (a)(5)(C)
The official responsible for the
State motor vehicle authority
shall enter into an agreement
with the Commissioner of Social
Security under 205(r)(8) of the
Social Security Act.
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6. ID requirements for voters
who register by mail
This would be a new requirement in Massachusetts. 
Note: Massachusetts law does not require identification from new
registrants. The law gives election officers the right to ask for “…suitable
written identification…” of anyone desiring to vote. (Mass. Gen. L., ch.
54, ch. 76B). In practice, poll workers will ask this only of inactive voters
and under instructions from the Clerk or Election Commission. One
manual states: “Identification requests should not discriminate in any
way, but should be entirely random or based on reasonable suspicion.” 
303 (b)(1)-(3)
New registrants who registered
by mail will be asked to present
a valid photo ID the first time
they go to the polls to vote or a
copy of a current utility bill,
bank statement, government
check, paycheck, or other
government document that
shows the name and address of
the voter; or if the person votes
absentee or by mail, they must
submit a copy of the same with
the ballot.
If the person does not have such
an ID or statements, then they
will able to cast a provisional
ballot. Absentee or mail in
ballots that fail to contain the ID
or statement will be counted as
provisional ballots.
Note: there is very wide
exemption from the ID
requirement for those who:
■ Include the ID or statement
with their registration
application;
■ Include their drivers license
or last 4 digits of the social
security number; OR
■ Are entitled to an absentee
ballot under the Uniformed
and Overseas Citizens
Absentee Voting Act (42
U.S.C. 1973ff 1 et seq.); Voting
Accessibility for the Elderly
and Handicapped Act (42
U.S.C. 1973ee 1(b)(2)(B)(ii));
or in the armed forces. 
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7. Mail-in Registration Form 
This would be a new requirement in Massachusetts.
303 (b)(4)(A) (i) – (iii)
Mail-in registration forms must
include the following questions:
“Are you a citizen of the United
States of America?”; 
Will you be 18 years of age on or
before election day?”; and “if
you checked no to either of these
do not complete form”.
This would be a new requirement in Massachusetts.
303 (b)(4)(A) (iv)
Mail-in registration forms must
include ID or utility bill etc..
requirements.
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TABLE 1 
Voting Equipment Certified in Massachusetts
Voting Equipment Type Model
Optical scan Optech
Optech Eagle
Accuvote
Punch card Datavote
Lever Machine AVM 40
AVM 50
Paper N/A
Source: Massachusetts Elections Division.
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TABLE 2 
Voting Equipment Used in Massachusetts, 1960 to 2002
Year Punch Lever Optical Punch Lever Optical
cards machines Paper scan cards machines Paper scan
1960 0 11 340 0 — 23.0 77.0 —
1962 0 12 339 0 — 22.6 77.4 —
1964 0 19 332 0 — 24.9 75.1 —
1966 0 22 329 0 — 25.0 75.0 —
1968 13 32 306 0 8.6 27.2 64.2 —
1970 13 34 304 0 5.7 27.3 67.0 —
1972 18 45 288 0 9.3 28.4 62.3 —
1974 27 44 280 0 14.5 27.4 58.1 —
1976 38 46 267 0 19.7 27.8 52.5 —
1978 52 46 253 0 25.0 27.7 47.3 —
1980 72 46 233 0 29.9 27.6 42.5 —
1982 74 46 231 0 30.3 27.4 42.3 —
1984 90 46 216 0 36.9 20.8 42.3 —
1986 98 46 208 0 42.3 27.2 30.4 —
1988 98 42 171 40 42.9 25.7 20.9 10.5
1990 96 42 165 48 42.6 25.2 18.7 13.5
1992 92 39 161 59 41.0 24.3 17.3 17.3
1994 75 38 147 91 33.1 23.6 12.3 31.1
1996 48 27 112 164 20.7 17.4 6.4 55.6
1998 10 26 93 222 2.9 16.6 4.4 75.9
2000 4 21 81 245 1.7 15.1 3.5 79.7
2002 2 20 77 252 3.1 13.3 0.7 83.0
Source: Massachusetts Elections Division files and Secretary of State Public Document 43.
Number of Municipalities Percent of Voters
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TABLE 3 
Massachusetts Residual Vote Rate in Statewide Races, 1990 to 2002
Attorney Secretary 
Year President Senator Governor General of State Treasurer Auditor
1990 4.4% 3.5% 7.1% 9.1% 6.4% 10.4%
1992 1.7%
1994 2.3% 3.0% 6.4% 11.8% 6.2% 10.9%
1996 1.7% 1.7%
1998 1.7% 5.7% 7.4% 6.9% 7.6%
2000 1.1% 4.9%
2002 9.6% 1.2% 27.3% 10.3% 7.5% 15.7%
Source: Massachusetts Elections Division files and Secretary of State Public Document 43.
TABLE 4 
Voting Equipment Used in Massachusetts, 1960 to 2002
Year Punch Lever Optical Punch Lever Optical Punch Lever Optical
cards machines Paper scan cards machines Paper scan cards machines Paper scan
1990 3.6% 3.9% 3.3% 2.6% 5.0% 4.7% 3.3% 3.7%
1992 3.0% 1.1% 0.6% 1.0%
1994 3.8% 3.7% 1.8% 2.3% 3.7% 1.8% 1.1% 1.8%
1996 3.1% 1.8% 0.8% 1.2% 3.1% 1.9% 0.8% 1.2%
1998 2.5% 1.9% 1.1% 1.6%
2000 1.4% 1.5% 0.7% 1.1% 5.6% 7.6% 3.7% 4.5%
2002 1.9% 0.8% 2.0% 1.0% 11.2% 7.7% 13.6% 9.0%
Source: Secretary of State, Public Document 43 and Massachusetts Elections Division.
President Governor U.S. Senator
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TABLE 5 
Residual vote rate for “Question 1” by voting machine type in each statewide election, 1990 to 2002
Year Summary Passed Punch Lever Paper Optical scan Total
1990 Repeal state census Y 8.0% 13.2% 6.3% 6.7% 8.8%
1992 Create health protection fund Y 5.4% 13.8% 3.4% 3.8% 6.8%
for tobacco use education
1994 Regulating spending on N 9.0% 11.2% 6.6% 5.9% 8.3%
ballot question campaigns
1996 Changing the trapping Y 14.1% 25.7% 4.8% 13.1% 14.9%
and hunting laws
1998 Setting the compensation Y 11.1% 22.7% 7.7% 9.6% 11.7%
of state legislators
2000 Earlier redistricting for  Y 11.5% 12.3% 5.9% 7.0% 7.9%
State legislators and
and Governors’ Councillors
2002 Eliminating the State N 8.8% 20.6% 5.1% 11.5% 11.9%
personal income tax
Average 9.7% 17.1% 5.7% 8.2% 10.0%
Source: Secretary of State, Public Document 43 and State Election Division.
TABLE 6 
Residual vote rate for local ballot questions in 2002
Community No on Marijuana Fund Clean 
All Questions Proposition 21/2 Pres. Act Finneran $100 fine Elections
Auditor
Lever 31.4% — — 33.5% 31.0% 33.1%
Paper 14.9% 9.9% — 18.5% 8.4% —
Punch card 19.0% — — — — 19.0%
Optical scan 13.1% 5.9% 9.0% 19.3% 13.2% 14.6%
Total 16.1% 6.0% 9.0% 20.7% 21.1% 19.3%
Source: State Elections Division.
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